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THE CASE AGAINST A STRICT LIABILITY 
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE PENALTY 
Kathleen DeLaney Thomas* 
The latest wave in tax shelter reform is the recent codification of the 
so-called “economic substance doctrine” and the accompanying strict 
liability penalty for violations of the doctrine.  The new strict liability 
penalty has been criticized by tax scholars and practitioners for being 
unfair and disproportionate.  However, most commentators have not 
evaluated whether there is any need for a separate penalty for violations of 
the economic substance doctrine at all, strict liability or otherwise.  The 
first part of this Article considers the new economic substance penalty in 
light of the current penalties applicable to tax shelters and argues that a 
separate penalty provision for violations of the economic substance 
doctrine should not have been enacted.  This Article will demonstrate that 
the current accuracy-related penalty regime is sufficient to address 
transactions that violate the economic substance doctrine and that the new 
penalty adds significant and undue complexity to the current regime. 
This Article will then explore the strict liability aspect of the penalty 
and consider whether there is any justification for carving out transactions 
that violate the economic substance doctrine as especially deserving of 
strict liability as compared to other tax shelter transactions.  Congress’s 
justifications for the new strict liability penalty largely focus on taxpayer 
deterrence and reducing disadvantages to the IRS in enforcing penalties.  
However, Congress has failed to articulate why violations of the economic 
substance doctrine have been singled out for strict liability when other tax 
shelter penalties contain taxpayer defenses.  The only way to properly 
justify a new tax shelter penalty with strict liability would be to tie that 
penalty to the most egregious forms of taxpayer misconduct, but there 
appears to be no link between violations of economic substance and the 
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worst kinds of tax shelters.  Given that violations of the economic substance 
doctrine are not a proxy for the most abusive tax shelter transactions, this 
Article concludes that the imposition of a strict liability penalty cannot be 
reconciled with other tax shelter penalties that provide for various forms of 
a reasonable cause defense. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tax shelters have plagued the IRS for decades, particularly because 
they are a moving target.  Taxpayers continually find new ways to achieve 
unintended tax benefits through creative, technical readings of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  Because participation in tax shelters is so difficult to 
prohibit ex ante, Congress has long relied on tax penalties to discourage 
this conduct.  Starting in the early 1980s, three distinct accuracy-related 
penalties were introduced to the Internal Revenue Code to specifically 
address tax shelter transactions.
1
  These provisions attack tax shelters from 
several angles, penalizing transactions designed to inflate a taxpayer‟s 
basis,
2
 transactions with a significant purpose of tax avoidance,
3
 and 
reportable and listed transactions that have been specifically identified as 
having the potential for abuse.
4
 
With each new penalty, Congress has attempted to take a harder line 
on tax shelter participants.  As these provisions have been amended over 
time, taxpayer defenses have either been removed or pared down 
significantly.
5
  However, as new, more potent penalty provisions have been 
added to the IRS‟s arsenal in its fight against tax shelters, the older penalty 
provisions have been left largely intact.  The result is that for any one 
transaction, a complicated matrix of penalty possibilities exists, with 
different rates and taxpayer defenses available depending on which penalty 
is applied.
6
 
The latest wave in tax shelter reform is the recent codification of the 
so-called “economic substance doctrine” and the accompanying strict 
liability penalty for violations of the doctrine.  The penalty was signed into 
law on March 30, 2010, as part of the health care reconciliation bill passed 
by Congress.
7
  The new legislation provides for a 20 percent penalty for 
 
 1. See infra Part II.A.  Additionally, there are penalties specifically aimed at tax 
shelter transactions that are not considered “accuracy-related” penalties.  See infra text 
accompanying note 17. 
 2. See I.R.C. § 6662(h) (West 2010) (gross valuation misstatement penalty). 
 3. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (West 2010) (substantial understatement penalty for tax 
shelter transactions). 
 4. See I.R.C. § 6662A (West 2010) (reportable transaction understatement penalty). 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 7. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong., § 
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disclosed transactions that violate the economic substance doctrine, and a 
40 percent penalty for undisclosed transactions.
8
  The penalty also provides 
for strict liability, meaning no reasonable cause or other defenses are 
available to taxpayers.
9
  The new economic substance penalty adds yet 
another layer to the existing tax shelter penalty matrix. 
Justifications for the new strict liability penalty largely focus on 
taxpayer deterrence and reducing disadvantages to the IRS in enforcing 
penalties.
10
  However, proponents of the penalty have failed to explain why 
the standard for tax shelter penalties has evolved into strict liability in the 
context of the economic substance doctrine.  Tax shelter penalties have 
become harsher over time, yet it is unclear whether the strict liability 
penalty represents a new Congressional attitude towards cracking down on 
all tax shelter transactions or whether violations of the economic substance 
doctrine deserve special treatment separate and apart from tax shelter 
transactions covered by the existing penalty regime. 
On the other side of the debate, the strict liability penalty has been 
criticized by tax scholars and practitioners for being unfair and 
disproportionate.
11
  The criticisms generally focus on the fundamental 
problems with strict liability, both as it relates to tax penalties in general 
and as it relates to the economic substance doctrine.  However, the 
controversy generated by the strict liability aspect of the new penalty has 
resulted in a tendency to view the penalty in a vacuum.  What most 
commentators have not done is evaluate whether there is any need for a 
separate penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine at all, 
and whether an accuracy-related penalty that provides for strict liability 
belongs in the current penalty regime.
12
 
This Article will consider the new economic substance penalty in light 
of the current penalties applicable to tax shelters and argue that a separate 
strict liability penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine 
should not have been enacted.  To be clear, this Article does not attempt to 
 
1409 (2010).  The Obama administration had also supported a strict liability penalty for 
violations of the economic substance doctrine.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH 
CONG., JCS-3-09, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT‟S 
FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL; PART TWO: BUSINESS TAX PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 
2009) [hereinafter JCS-3-09], available at 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=7.  
 8. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong., § 
1409 (2010). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-206, at 91-92 (2007); JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 63. 
 11. See infra note 98. 
 12. Technically, the new economic substance penalty has now become part of the 
current penalty regime.  For purposes of this Article, however, I will use the phrase “current 
penalty regime” to mean the accuracy-related penalties that existed immediately prior to the 
enactment of the new economic substance penalty. 
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address whether strict liability is ever appropriate in the context of tax 
penalties, nor does it address the merits of a reasonable cause defense to the 
economic substance penalty.  Rather, this Article examines whether a new 
strict liability penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine 
should be part of the current accuracy-related penalty regime.  My claim is 
that a fourth tax shelter penalty is redundant in light of the current 
accuracy-related penalties applicable to tax shelters, and that singling out 
the economic substance doctrine for strict liability cannot be justified when 
this standard has not been applied to other tax shelter penalties. 
First, the new economic substance penalty results in significant 
overlap with other tax shelter penalties, as there don‟t appear to be 
transactions that would fall under the economic substance doctrine that are 
not covered by these other penalties.  For example, it is hard to conceive of 
a transaction that violates the economic substance doctrine that wouldn‟t 
also meet the broad definition of “tax shelter” for purposes of the 
substantial understatement penalty under I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C).
13
  
Congress has not identified what types of transactions it intended to capture 
with the new economic substance penalty that are not covered by the 
current tax shelter penalties. 
Second, adding a fourth accuracy-related penalty aimed at tax shelters, 
with its own set of standards, adds significant and unnecessary complexity 
to the tax shelter penalty regime.  Tax penalties should be consistent and 
understandable, which encourages compliance by helping taxpayers 
understand the potential consequences of their conduct.
14
  In contrast to 
these objectives, the economic substance penalty further complicates the 
existing penalty matrix and makes it difficult for taxpayers to understand 
and predict the consequences of their behavior.  Courts are already divided 
over which of the existing accuracy-related penalties should apply in the 
case of tax shelters,
15
 and it appears that the IRS will have the ability to 
pick and choose between the new economic substance penalty and the 
accuracy-related penalties already at its disposal. 
Third, even if a separate penalty for violations of the economic 
substance doctrine were justifiable, the strict liability aspect of the penalty 
cannot be reconciled with the defenses available for other tax shelter 
penalties.  The economic substance doctrine is a judicial doctrine used to 
disallow tax benefits not intended by the Internal Revenue Code.
16
  It does 
 
 13. A “tax shelter” is defined as “a partnership or other entity, any investment plan or 
arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, 
entity, plan or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.”  I.R.C. § 
6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (West 2010). 
 14. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 15. See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 16. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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not identify a new type of behavior not anticipated by other tax shelter 
penalties, but rather provides a legal basis to disallow tax shelter benefits 
where other substantive provisions of the tax law fall short.  Given that 
violations of the economic substance doctrine do not represent a unique 
subset of taxpayer behavior, there is no reason why taxpayer defenses to an 
economic substance penalty should be more limited than the defenses to 
other tax shelter penalties. 
Fourth, carving out violations of the economic substance doctrine as a 
unique subset of tax shelter transactions with a stricter penalty as compared 
to other tax shelter penalties treats similarly situated taxpayers differently, 
leading to unjust and even absurd results.  Based on the arguments set forth 
above, I conclude that a new strict liability penalty for violations of the 
economic substance doctrine should not have been adopted. 
This article will proceed as follows:  Part II offers an overview of the 
current penalties applicable to tax shelter transactions, exclusive of the new 
economic substance penalty.  It also provides a brief overview of the 
economic substance doctrine and the application of the current penalty 
regime to violations of the doctrine by courts and the IRS prior to the 
codification of the economic substance doctrine and the enactment of the 
new economic substance penalty.  Part III describes the legislation that was 
recently enacted and summarizes the primary justifications for and 
criticisms of the new penalty.  Part IV argues against a separate economic 
substance penalty in light of the current penalties applicable to tax shelters.  
Part V critiques the strict liability aspect of the new economic substance 
penalty as it relates to the standards in other tax shelter penalties.  Part VI 
concludes. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTIES AND THE ECONOMIC 
SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 
A.  The Evolution of Accuracy-Related Penalties Aimed at Tax Shelters 
Over the past several decades, and prior to the recent codification of 
the economic substance doctrine, three accuracy-related penalties were 
added to the Internal Revenue Code to address the tax shelter epidemic.
17
  
 
 17. “Accuracy-related” penalties are generally based on a substantively incorrect return 
position.  See I.R.C. §§ 6662 and 6662A (West 2010).  There are a number of penalties that 
are not accuracy-related penalties that are intended to address other aspects of tax shelter 
transactions.  These include penalties for failure to furnish information regarding reportable 
transactions under I.R.C. § 6706; failure to include reportable transaction information with a 
return under I.R.C. § 6707A; failure to maintain lists of advisees with respect to material 
transactions under I.R.C. §6708; and the penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters under 
I.R.C. § 6700. 
     Additionally, there are accuracy-related penalties that are not specifically targeted at tax 
shelter transactions, although the IRS could choose to apply them to any incorrect return 
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An examination of how these penalties have evolved over time provides the 
historical backdrop for the recent legislation that added a strict liability 
penalty to the Code for violations of the economic substance doctrine.  
These prior tax shelter penalties have all provided taxpayer defenses, and 
Congress has stated as recently as 2003 that it did not intend to provide for 
strict liability for tax shelter transactions.
18
  However, the recent trend has 
been to make tax shelter penalties increasingly tougher on taxpayers, which 
has been accomplished largely by narrowing the reasonable cause defense 
and other defenses available for these penalties. 
1. Valuation Misstatement Penalty 
The first of these tax shelter penalties was added to the Internal 
Revenue Code in 1981, when Congress introduced a valuation 
misstatement penalty to address the “500,000 tax disputes outstanding 
which involve property valuation questions of more than routine 
significance.”
19
  Because Congress concluded that taxpayers had been 
encouraged to overvalue certain types of property, and because valuation of 
unique property is so difficult, the new penalty imposed a “bright line” test 
for significant overvaluations.
20
  Although neither the statute nor the 
legislative history of the valuation misstatement penalty uses the phrase 
“tax shelter,” both commentators and courts have viewed the penalty as a 
direct response to the tax shelter problem.
21
 
The current valuation misstatement penalty provides for a 20 percent 
 
position, including a position that resulted from participation in a tax shelter.  See, e.g., 
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (West 2010) (20 percent penalty on an underpayment of tax attributable 
to negligence or disregard of rules and regulations). 
 18. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 243 (1981).  The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 722, 95 Stat. 172, 341, added new § 6659 to the Internal Revenue 
Code.  I.R.C. § 6659 was repealed by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, which included the valuation misstatement penalty in current 
I.R.C. § 6662. 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 243. 
 21. See, e.g., McCrary v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 827, 863 (1989) (Gerber, J., 
dissenting) (“Valuation is one of the major devices used in abusive tax shelters.  It is the 
value inherent in an asset that will imbue a transaction with economic substance.”); Rose v. 
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386, 425 (1987), aff’d, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that 
Congress‟s intent that penalties be applied in tax shelter cases is “particularly true to the 
extent that tax motivated transactions . . . include „any valuation overstatement‟”); Kathleen 
O. Lier, The Evolution in Tax Shelter Litigation: The Tax Court Closes the Door on Generic 
Tax Shelters, But a Window Remains Open with Respect to the Additions to Tax and the 
Increased Interest Under I.R.C. § 6621(C), 36 LOY. L. REV. 275, 276 (1990) (noting that 
Congress responded to the significant backlog in the courts due to tax shelter cases); 
Richard J. Wood, Accuracy-Related Penalties: A Question of Values, 76 IOWA L. REV. 309, 
310 (1991) (noting the valuation provisions were historically a battle against tax shelters). 
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penalty on the portion of the underpayment of tax attributable to a 
substantial valuation misstatement and a 40 percent penalty on the 
underpayment attributable to a gross valuation misstatement.
22
  A 
substantial valuation misstatement results when the value or basis of 
property claimed on a return is 150 percent or more of the correct value,
23
 
and a gross valuation misstatement results when the claimed value is 200 
percent or more of the correct value.
24
  When the correct value or basis of 
property is zero, any amount claimed on a return with respect to the value 
of such property will result in a gross valuation misstatement.
25
  A 
taxpayer‟s only defense against a valuation misstatement penalty is a 
showing that she acted with reasonable cause and in good faith.
26
 
2. Substantial Understatement Penalty with Tax Shelter Carve Out 
Shortly after the valuation misstatement penalty was enacted in 1981, 
the substantial understatement penalty was added to the roster.
27
  An 
understatement on a taxpayer‟s return generally refers to the excess of the 
amount of tax required to be shown on the return over the amount of tax 
actually shown on the return.
28
  A substantial understatement exists if the 
amount of the understatement exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the tax 
required to be shown on the return or $5000.
29
  The current substantial 
 
 22. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(3), (h)(1) (West 2010).  An “underpayment” means the amount by 
which the correct tax exceeds the amount shown on the taxpayer‟s return plus any amounts 
not shown on the return that were previously assessed or collected.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-
2(a) (2007).  For example, amounts previously withheld but not reflected on a return should 
reduce a taxpayer‟s underpayment. 
 23. I.R.C. § 6662(e)(1)(A) (West 2010). 
 24. I.R.C. § 6662(h)(2)(A)(i) (West 2010). 
 25. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(g) (1992).  This regulation has not been amended to reflect 
amendments to I.R.C. § 6662(h) in 2006, which changed the threshold for a gross valuation 
misstatement from 400 percent to 200 percent.  See P.L. 109-280, § 1219(a)(2)(A) (2006) 
(amending the definition of gross valuation misstatement in 6662(h)(2)(A)). 
 26. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2010).  The determination of whether a taxpayer acted 
with reasonable cause and in good faith is based on an evaluation of all of the facts and 
circumstances.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (2003).  The most important factor is the extent of 
the taxpayer‟s efforts to assess her proper tax liability.  Id.  Circumstances that may indicate 
reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is 
reasonable in light of the taxpayer‟s experience, knowledge, and education, or reliance on 
the advice of a professional if such reliance was reasonable under the circumstances and the 
taxpayer acted in good faith.  Id.  There are additional requirements for valuation 
misstatements relating to charitable deductions.  See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2) (West 2010). 
 27. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 
(adding new I.R.C. § 6661).  I.R.C. § 6661 was repealed by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act 
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, and the substantial understatement penalty 
was combined with the valuation misstatement penalty in current I.R.C. § 6662. 
 28. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(A) (West 2010). 
 29. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1) (West 2010). 
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understatement penalty, for both tax shelter and non-tax shelter 
transactions, is 20 percent of the underpayment attributable to the 
substantial understatement.
30
 
The substantial understatement penalty was originally enacted to 
reduce taxpayer incentives to take questionable return positions that, if not 
rising to the level of fraud or negligence, subjected taxpayers to nothing 
more than tax and interest if successfully challenged on audit.
31
  Although 
taxpayers could generally avoid the new substantial understatement penalty 
by either disclosing the transaction or having substantial authority for their 
positions,
32
 the disclosure exception was not available for tax shelter 
transactions.  A “tax shelter” was originally defined as an item arising from 
“a partnership or other entity, plan[,] or arrangement[,] the principal 
purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax.”
33
 
Under the originally enacted substantial understatement rules, 
taxpayers engaged in tax shelters needed to demonstrate both substantial 
authority for their position and a reasonable belief that the treatment 
claimed was more likely than not the proper treatment.
34
  With respect to 
these more stringent requirements for tax shelters, Congress explained that 
“if the principal purpose of a transaction is the reduction of tax, it is not 
unreasonable to hold participants to a higher standard than ordinary 
taxpayers.”
35
 
The provision was amended in 1994 to remove the substantial 
authority and reasonable belief excuse for corporate taxpayers engaged in 
 
 30. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b)(2) (West 2010). 
 31. S. REP. NO. 97-494(I), at 222-223 (1982). 
 32. Former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B).  Under the current substantial understatement rules 
for non-tax shelter transactions, a taxpayer can avoid the penalty by showing: (1) she had a 
reasonable basis for her position and the position was disclosed; (2) she had substantial 
authority for her position; or (3) she acted with reasonable cause and in good faith.  I.R.C. 
§§ 6662(d)(2)(B) and 6664(c)(1) (West 2010). 
    To have a reasonable basis, a return position must be more than arguable.  Treas. Reg. § 
1.6662-3(b)(3) (2003).  A return position reasonably based on the Internal Revenue Code, 
Treasury regulations, revenue rulings, tax treaties, legislative history, private rulings, or 
other authorities listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (2003) is generally treated as 
having a reasonable basis, even if it does not meet the substantial authority standard.  Id.  
The substantial authority standard is less stringent than the more likely than not standard 
(requiring more than a 50 percent likelihood of success), but more stringent than the 
reasonable basis standard.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2003).  Whether there is 
substantial authority for a return position must be determined by weighing the relevant 
authorities supporting the treatment against the authorities supporting contrary treatment.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3) (2003).  Substantial authority is an objective standard and the 
taxpayer‟s subjective belief is not relevant.  Id. 
 33. H.R. CONF. REP. 97-760, at 576 (1982).  See also former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(ii). 
 34. See former I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(i). 
 35. H.R. CONF. REP. 97-760, at 576 (1982). 
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tax shelter transactions.
36
  Congress further expanded the scope of the 
penalty in 1997 by redefining tax shelter transactions as having “a 
significant purpose” of tax avoidance, replacing the prior “principal 
purpose” standard.
37
  Additionally, in 2004, Congress removed the 
substantial authority and reasonable belief excuse for all taxpayers 
participating in tax shelters.
38
 
As it stands today, a substantial understatement with respect to a tax 
shelter can be avoided by an individual taxpayer by showing that she acted 
with reasonable cause and in good faith.
39
   In the case of a corporate 
taxpayer, the penalty can be avoided only through a special, more heighted 
reasonable cause and good faith requirement, which requires, at a 
minimum, substantial authority and a reasonable belief that the treatment 
claimed was more likely than not correct.
40
 
3. Reportable Transaction Understatement Penalty 
Further changes were introduced to the Internal Revenue Code to 
combat tax shelters with the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004 (the “Jobs Act”).
41
  In addition to removing the substantial authority 
and reasonable belief excuse from the substantial understatement penalty 
for taxpayers participating in tax shelters,
42
 the Jobs Act created new I.R.C. 
§ 6662A, which imposes an accuracy-related penalty on listed transactions 
and reportable transactions with a significant tax avoidance purpose.
43
  A 
reportable transaction is a specific type of transaction identified by 
Treasury regulations as having the potential for tax avoidance or evasion.
44
  
 
 36. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 744(b), 108 Stat. 4809, 
5011 (1994) (amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i), amended by American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004)). 
 37. P.L. 105-34, § 1028(c)(2) (1997), amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii). 
 38. P.L. 108-357, § 812(d).  The excuse is maintained for individuals in Treas. Reg. § 
1.6664-4(g) (2003), which remains outstanding.  This excuse should apply to individual 
taxpayers for tax years ending before October 23, 2004, i.e., before the effective date of the 
2004 amendments to I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2003). 
 39. I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(C), 6664(c)(1) (West 2010). 
 40. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (West 2010), Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(g)(1)(ii) (2003), 
1.6664-4(f) (2003).  A taxpayer is considered to have a reasonable belief that the tax 
treatment of an item is more likely than not correct if: (1) she concludes in good faith that 
there is a greater than 50 percent likelihood her position will be upheld after a analysis of 
the pertinent authorities; or (2) if the taxpayer reasonably relies in good faith on an opinion 
of a tax advisor that is based on the tax advisor‟s analysis of the pertinent authorities and 
concludes that there is a greater than 50 percent likelihood that the taxpayer‟s position 
would be upheld.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (2003). 
 41. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
 42. Id. at § 812(d), 118 Stat. at 1580.  See also text accompanying note 39. 
 43. Id. at § 812(a), 118 Stat. at 1577-78. 
 44. I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d), 6707A(c)(1) (West 2010).  Reportable transactions are defined 
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A listed transaction, which is a type of reportable transaction, has been 
specifically identified by an IRS publication as a tax avoidance 
transaction.
45
 
The reportable transaction understatement penalty is equal to 20 
percent of the reportable transaction understatement for a disclosed 
transaction,
46
 and 30 percent of the reportable transaction understatement 
for an undisclosed transaction.
47
  The reportable transaction understatement 
is generally determined by multiplying the increase in taxable income 
imposed upon the taxpayer from applying the proper tax treatment times 
the highest rate of tax applicable to the taxpayer.
48
 
The legislative history of I.R.C. § 6662A provides that “[b]ecause 
disclosure is so vital to combating abusive tax-avoidance transactions . . . 
the Committee believes that a more meaningful (but not strict liability) 
accuracy-related penalty should apply to such transactions even when 
disclosed.”
49
  The only excuse to the reportable transaction understatement 
penalty is a strengthened reasonable cause and good faith defense, which, 
at a minimum, requires disclosure of the transaction, substantial authority, 
and a reasonable belief that the claimed treatment was more likely than not 
correct.
50
  Although the stated purpose of I.R.C. § 6662A was to replace the 
current rules applicable to tax shelters with a new penalty,
51
 the substantial 
understatement and valuation misstatement rules of I.R.C. § 6662 have 
been left intact. 
B. The Application of Accuracy-Related Penalties in Economic 
Substance Doctrine Cases 
A brief overview of the economic substance doctrine is in order to 
understand the context of the recently enacted penalty legislation at issue in 
this Article, which flows from Congressional efforts to codify the economic 
substance doctrine.  Additionally, an examination of how the current 
penalty regime has been applied to transactions that lack economic 
 
in Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (2010), and include listed transactions, confidential 
transactions, transactions with contractual protection, loss transactions, and transactions that 
have been specifically identified by the IRS as transactions of interest.  Taxpayers that have 
participated in reportable transactions must report the transaction on IRS Form 8886, 
Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a), (e) (2010). 
 45. I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d), 6707A(c)(2) (West 2010); Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2010). 
 46. I.R.C. § 6662A(a) (West 2010). 
 47. I.R.C. § 6662A(c) (West 2010). 
 48. I.R.C. § 6662A(b) (West 2010). 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 108-393, at 183 (2003). 
 50. See I.R.C. § 6664(d) (West 2010).  There is no reasonable cause exception if the 
transaction is undisclosed. 
 51. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-393, at 183 (noting that the provision replaces “the rules 
applicable to tax shelters with a new accuracy-related penalty.”). 
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substance in the absence of a special penalty provision sets the stage for my 
argument that an additional economic substance penalty is unnecessary and 
creates undue complexity within the current penalty regime. 
1. Overview of the Economic Substance Doctrine 
The economic substance doctrine has been developed by courts as a 
means of disregarding "transactions that comply with the literal terms of 
the tax law but lack economic reality."
52
  Over time, the doctrine has 
evolved into having two components: (1) an objective prong, requiring a 
transaction to have economic substance (generally reflected in a realistic 
possibility of profit or a change in the taxpayer‟s financial position); and 
(2) a subjective prong, requiring a valid business purpose apart from tax 
avoidance.
53
  Before the doctrine was codified, there was some 
disagreement among the federal circuit courts as to whether a taxpayer 
must satisfy both prongs to satisfy the economic substance doctrine, or if 
satisfaction of one prong is sufficient.
54
  However, it was always clear that 
a transaction that lacks both a non-tax business purpose and objective 
economic substance can be disregarded by courts under the economic 
 
 52. Coltec Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 454 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also 
Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. U.S., 568 F.3d 537, 543 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Coltec and 
explaining the economic substance doctrine). 
    The origin of the doctrine can be traced to a line of Supreme Court decisions beginning 
with Gregory v. Helvering, in which the Court disregarded a transaction, even though it 
technically complied with the relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions, because it was 
undertaken solely to avoid a tax on a distribution from the taxpayer‟s wholly owned 
corporation.  293 U.S. 465 (1935).  See also Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1352 (describing the origin 
of economic substance doctrine).  Subsequently, in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, the 
Supreme Court announced that a taxpayer‟s chosen form will be respected where “there is a 
genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or 
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent 
considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless 
labels attached . . . .”  435 U.S. 561, 583-584 (1978). 
 53. See, e.g., Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1355-56 (describing the subjective and objective 
aspects of the economic substance doctrine); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 544 
(requiring the taxpayer to demonstrate two prongs); ACM P‟ship v. Commissioner, 157 
F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) (utilizing both subjective and objective prongs); Rice's Toyota 
World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring a legitimate 
business purpose or economic substance). 
 54. Compare Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 544 (adopting the majority view 
that lack of economic substance alone is enough to invalidate a transaction), and Coltec, 454 
F.3d at 1355 (same) with Rice’s Toyota, 752 F.2d at 91-92 (requiring both a lack of 
objective economic substance and a valid business purpose for transaction to be 
disregarded).  The Third Circuit has taken the view that the subjective and objective tests 
“do not constitute discrete prongs of a „rigid two-step analysis,‟ but rather represent related 
factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient 
substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”  ACM P’ship, 
157 F.3d at 247. 
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substance doctrine. 
2. Penalizing Violations of Economic Substance Under the Current 
Regime 
Before the separate economic substance penalty was signed into law, 
the IRS was presented with a variety of choices from the current accuracy-
related penalty regime when confronting a transaction that lacked economic 
substance.  The government most frequently asserts that the gross valuation 
misstatement penalty applies in economic substance doctrine cases.
55
  The 
substantial understatement penalty has also been asserted in the alternative, 
although the accuracy-related penalties of I.R.C. § 6662 cannot be applied 
cumulatively, nor can they be combined with the reportable transaction 
understatement penalty under I.R.C. § 6662A.
56
 
a. Application of Gross Valuation Misstatement Penalty by 
Courts 
There is a split among the federal circuit courts as to whether the gross 
valuation misstatement penalty applies to violations of the economic 
substance doctrine.  Courts in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Circuits have held that when an understatement stems from deductions that 
are disallowed due to a lack of economic substance, the deficiency is 
attributable to an overstatement of value and the penalty applies.
57
  On the 
 
 55. See, e.g., Keller v. Comm‟r, 556 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming a 20 percent 
negligence penalty arising from a cattle-breeding tax shelter but declining to uphold the 
IRS‟s assertion of a gross valuation misstatement penalty); Long Term Capital Holdings v. 
U.S., 330 F.Supp.2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004) (sustaining the IRS determinations of 40 percent 
gross valuation misstatement and 20 percent substantial understatement penalties related to 
capital losses arising from the unwinding of the Long Term Capital Management portfolio), 
aff’d 2005-2 USTC ¶50,575 (2d Cir. 2005); Clearmeadow Investments v. U.S., 87 Fed. Cl. 
509 (2009) (holding that gross valuation overstatement penalties applied while disallowing 
loss deductions from a tax shelter known as “Son of BOSS”). 
 56. See I.R.C. § 6662(b) (West 2010) (flush language), I.R.C. § 6662A(e)(2)(B) (West 
2010), Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c).  However, the amount of the reportable transaction 
understatement is included when determining whether a taxpayer‟s understatement is 
“substantial” for purposes of I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1).  I.R.C. § 6662A(e)(1). 
 57. See Merino v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 147, 158-159 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying 
valuation overstatement penalty where overvaluation of the property was “an essential 
component of the tax avoidance scheme”); Zfass v. Commissioner, 118 F.3d 184, 191 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (affirming valuation overstatement penalty stemming from excessive deductions 
that were disallowed due to a lack of economic substance); Illes v. Commissioner, 982 F.2d 
163, 167 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying the valuation misstatement penalty when a transaction 
lacked economic substance); Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(affirming Tax Court's penalty imposition and citing Massengill); Massengill v. Comm‟r, 
876 F.2d 616, 619-620 (8th Cir. 1989) (opining that “[w]hen an underpayment stems from 
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other side of the divide, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have taken the position 
that when a deduction is denied because a transaction lacks economic 
substance, a valuation misstatement penalty may not be imposed because 
the understatement is attributable to an invalid deduction, rather than the 
overvaluation of an asset.
58
  The majority view is also the position taken by 
the IRS,
59
 so taxpayers who are not fortunate enough to reside within the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits will likely continue to face the gross valuation 
misstatement penalty in economic substance doctrine cases. 
b. Application of Other Penalties by Courts 
The 40 percent rate on gross valuation misstatements makes it a more 
attractive alternative to the substantial understatement penalty.
60
  It is not 
surprising, then, that if accuracy-related penalties are asserted at all in an 
economic substance doctrine case, the gross valuation misstatement penalty 
is almost always asserted, with substantial understatement and negligence 
 
disallowed depreciation deductions or investment credit due to lack of economic substance, 
the deficiency is attributable  to overstatement of value, and subject to penalty under section 
6659.”) (internal citation omitted). 
   This position has also been adopted by the Court of Federal Claims and the Tax Court, 
when not constrained.  See Clearmeadow Investments, 87 Fed. Cl. 509, at 535-536 (rejecting 
the idea that section 6662 permits avoidance of penalties due to a lack of economic 
substance); Petaluma FX Partners v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 84 (2008) (applying valuation 
misstatement penalties in a final partnership administrative adjustment [FPAA] case despite 
a lack of economic substance), rev’d on other grounds, 591 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(appealable to D.C. Circuit, which has not decided the issue); and Palm Canyon X 
Investments v. Comm‟r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009) (applying gross valuation 
misstatement penalty arising from a transaction disallowed under the economic substance 
doctrine) (appealable to D.C. Circuit).  The Tax Court will follow the decision of the Court 
of Appeals to which a case is appealable if the Court of Appeals has already decided the 
issue.  See Golsen v. Comm‟r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971) 
(stating that “better judicial administration requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision 
which is squarely on point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals and 
to that court alone.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 58. See Keller, 556 F.3d 1056, at 1061 (relying on Gainer as binding precedent and 
rejecting the Tax Court‟s imposition of gross valuation misstatement penalty); Gainer v. 
Commissioner, 893 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1990) (relying on congressional intent to reject 
Commissioner's assertion of valuation overstatement penalty); Heasley v. Commissioner, 
902 F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1990) (analogizing to Todd to reject assessment of valuation 
overstatement penalty); Todd v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting 
valuation overstatement penalty finding that the valuation overstatement did not create tax 
benefits that changed the amount of tax owed). 
 59. See, e.g., Notice 2002-50, 2002-2 C.B. 98 (providing an example of when a gross 
valuation misstatement penalty would be imposed as a result of an invalid deduction). 
 60. However, taxpayer defenses are more limited in the case of a substantial 
understatement with respect to a tax shelter.  See supra notes 26, 39-40 and accompanying 
text. 
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penalties frequently asserted as alternatives.
61
 
There have not yet been any economic substance doctrine cases 
involving the application of the reportable transaction understatement 
penalty.  This is also unsurprising, since the penalty is effective only for tax 
years ending after October 22, 2004,
62
 and the judicial decisions on 
economic substance generally come out a number of years after the 
transaction at issue.
63
 
In some economic substance doctrine cases, courts have rejected the 
government‟s assertion of any penalties, despite the government‟s success 
on the merits, finding that the taxpayer satisfied one of the applicable 
defenses, such as reasonable cause and good faith.
64
  Finally, there are a 
number of economic substance doctrine cases that do not address the issue 
of penalties at all.
65
 
 
 61. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund., 568 F.3d at 546 n.3 (reviewing § 6662 
penalties asserted by the Commissioner attributable to gross valuation misstatement, 
substantial understatement of income tax, substantial valuation misstatement, and 
substantial understatement of income tax.); Cemco Investors, LLC v. U.S.,  2007-1 USTC 
¶50,385 (reviewing § 6662 penalties asserted by the Commissioner attributable to gross 
valuation misstatement of adjusted basis), aff’d, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Long Term 
Capital Holdings v. U.S., 330 F.Supp.2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004) (reviewing § 6662 penalties 
asserted by the Commissioner attributable to gross valuation misstatement, and as an 
alternative, negligence, substantial understatement of income tax, or substantial valuation 
misstatement penalties), aff’d, 2005-2 USTC ¶50,575 (2d Cir. 2005); Palm Canyon, 98 
T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (reviewing Commissioner‟s assertions of gross and substantial valuation 
misstatements); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Comm‟r, 132 T.C. No. 9 (2009) (reviewing § 
6662 penalties asserted by the Commissioner attributable to gross valuation misstatement, 
and as an alternative, negligence, substantial understatement of income tax, or substantial 
valuation misstatement penalties); Stobie Creek Investments v. U.S., 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008) 
(reviewing the same); and Jade Trading v. U.S., 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007) (reviewing the same).  
But see TIFD III-E Inc. v. U.S., 660 F.Supp.2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009) (discussing, but 
declining to apply, the substantial understatement penalty for tax shelters; no mention of the 
gross valuation misstatement penalty). 
 62. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 812(f), 118 Stat. 1418 
(2004). 
 63. Even the most recent economic substance doctrine cases have involved tax years 
prior to 2004.  See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 537 (referring to tax years 
2000-2002); Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S., 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010) (referring to tax year 2002); 
TIFD III-E Inc. v. U.S., 660 F.Supp.2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009) (referring to tax years 1997 and 
1998); Palm Canyon, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (referring to tax year 2001); Country Pine Fin. 
v. Comm‟r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (2009) (referring to tax year 2001); Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. U.S., 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009) (referring to tax year 1997); Schering-Plough v. U.S., 
651 F.Supp.2d 219 (D.N.J. 2009) (referring to tax years 1991 and 1992). 
 64. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. U.S., 472 F.Supp.2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 
2007) (holding that the gross valuation misstatement penalty did not apply to violations of 
economic substance; and taxpayer satisfied substantial authority and reasonable belief that 
treatment was more likely than not correct defense for substantial understatement penalty 
for a tax shelter transaction), aff’d, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 65. See, e.g., Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1352 (failing to discuss penalties); ACM P’ship, 157 
F.3d at 231 (stating that the IRS did not assert penalties); Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 
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c. IRS’s Position on Penalties in Economic Substance Doctrine 
Cases 
The IRS has taken the position that the reportable transaction 
understatement penalty, the substantial understatement penalty with respect 
to a tax shelter, the negligence penalty, and the gross valuation 
misstatement penalty all may apply to a transaction that lacks economic 
substance.
66
  In informal guidance, the IRS has also indicated a preference 
for the gross valuation misstatement penalty or the reportable transaction 
understatement penalty, when they apply.
67
 
III. A NEW PENALTY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE 
DOCTRINE 
As a result of the disagreement among courts as to whether the 
economic substance doctrine requires a taxpayer to demonstrate both 
objective economic substance and a subjective business purpose,
68
 and in 
light of the uncertainty as to how to apply both the objective and subjective 
tests, legislation codifying the economic substance doctrine was signed into 
law on March 30, 2010.
69
  The new legislation “clarifies that the economic 
substance doctrine involves a conjunctive analysis—there must be an 
inquiry regarding the objective effects of the transaction on the taxpayer‟s 
economic position as well as an inquiry regarding the taxpayer‟s subjective 
motives for engaging in the transaction.”
70
  Although the codification of the 
 
(stating that the IRS did not assert penalties); Consolidated Edison Co. v. U.S., 90 Fed. Cl. 
228 (2009) (stating that the IRS did not discuss penalties); Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 410 (stating that the IRS did not assert penalties).  
 66. E.g., Notice 2002-50, 2002-2 C.B. 98; Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730.  The IRS 
takes the position that these penalties apply in the alternative.  See supra note 56 and 
accompanying text. 
 67. See IRS Chief Counsel Advice, No. 200923042 (June 5, 2009) (suggesting that § 
6662A should be the primary penalty). 
 68. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 544 (stating that the law 
regarding whether the economic substance doctrine requires a taxpayer to demonstrate both  
objective economic substance and a subjective business purpose is split with the majority 
requiring only one prong to be lacking to invalidate a transaction); Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1355-
56 (finding that the lack of economic substance is sufficient to invalidate a transaction 
regardless of motive); ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 247 (explaining that the objective and 
subjective elements do not constitute discrete prongs of a two-step analysis, but rather are 
related factors which should be taken into account to determine whether the transaction had 
sufficient substance for tax purposes); Rice‟s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 
89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming that Frank Lyon Co. v. United States requires both prongs 
to be taken into account when determining whether the transaction is a sham). 
 69. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. 
§ 1409 (2010) (adding new I.R.C. § 7701(o)). 
 70. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-18-10, S. DOC. 2010-6147, TECHNICAL 
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economic substance doctrine is intended to provide “a uniform definition of 
economic substance,” it is not intended to alter the flexibility of courts in 
other respects, including a court‟s determination of when the doctrine is 
relevant to a particular transaction.
71
 
In addition to specifying that a conjunctive test is required, the 
legislation clarifies the requirements for both the objective and subjective 
prongs of the doctrine
72
 and provides other special rules such as those for 
determining whether a transaction has profit potential.
73
  The bill adds new 
I.R.C. § 7701(o), which states that a transaction shall be treated as having 
economic substance only if it changes the taxpayer‟s economic position in 
a meaningful way (apart from tax effects) and the taxpayer has a substantial 
purpose (apart from tax reasons) for entering into such transaction.
74
 
Additionally, the recently enacted legislation contains a provision for 
a separate, new strict liability penalty for violations of the economic 
substance doctrine.
75
  Legislative history surrounding the penalty provision 
is relatively sparse.  Although Congress has made it clear that the penalty is 
intended to deter abusive tax shelters,
76
 neither Congress nor the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (which has offered a number of technical 
explanations of the various proposals to codify the economic substance 
doctrine
77
) has offered insight as to why strict liability is now being 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010” 153 
(Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter JCX-18-10].  See also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-
11-10, S. DOC. 2010-5371, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE “AMERICAN WORKERS, STATE AND BUSINESS RELIEF ACT OF 2010,” 
(Comm. Print 2010) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter JCX-11-10]; JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-09, S. DOC. 2009-24413, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 3962, THE “AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR 
AMERICA ACT OF 2009” 89-90 (Comm. Print 2009) (as amended Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter 
JCX-47-09] (noting that the new legislation clarifies and enhances the doctrine by providing 
a uniform definition of economic substance). 
 71. JCX-18-10, supra note 70, at 152; JCX-11-10, supra note 70, at 189; JCX-47-09, 
supra note 70, at 90.  See also H.R. 4872, § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“[T]he 
provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any other rule 
of law . . . .”). 
    Much has been written about the wisdom (or lack thereof) of codifying the economic 
substance doctrine, an issue which is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., Monte 
Jackel, Farming for Economic Substance: Codification Fails to Bear Fruit, 119 TAX NOTES 
59 (2008); Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389 
(2010); Mark J. Silverman & Amanda P. Varma, The Future of Tax Planning: From Coltec 
to Schering-Plough, 126 TAX NOTES 341 (2010); Dennis Ventry, Save the Economic 
Substance Doctrine From Congress, 118 TAX NOTES 1405 (2008). 
 72. H.R. 4872, § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A),(B). 
 73. Id. at § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2). 
 74. Id. at § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1). 
 75. Id. at § 1409(b). 
 76. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 77. See JCX-18-10, supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
THOMASFINALIZED_THREE_UPDATED 2.DOC 3/31/2011  1:08 PM 
2011] STRICT LIABILITY ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE PENALTY 461 
 
imposed in the context of the economic substance doctrine. 
A. The New Economic Substance Penalty 
The new legislation amends I.R.C. § 6662 to provide for a twenty 
percent penalty for disclosed transactions that lack economic substance and 
a forty percent penalty for “nondisclosed noneconomic substance 
transactions.”
78
  The penalty covers “[a]ny disallowance of claimed tax 
benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance . . . or 
failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.”
79
  The statute 
does not define what is meant by “any similar rule of law.”  The legislative 
history however, states that the penalty is intended to apply to a transaction 
that is disregarded as a result of the application of the same factors as those 
used in an economic substance analysis, even if a term other than the 
“economic substance doctrine” is used.
80
 
The new penalty legislation also provides for strict liability, 
accomplished by amending I.R.C. § 6664(c) to eliminate the reasonable 
cause and good faith defense for any transaction lacking economic 
substance.
81
  Additionally, the bill eliminates the special reasonable cause 
and good faith defense for reportable transaction understatements
82
 for any 
portion of the reportable transaction understatement that is attributable to a 
transaction that lacks economic substance.  There is no corresponding 
provision to eliminate the reasonable cause and good faith defense for 
reportable transaction understatements attributable to tax shelters, nor does 
the bill eliminate that defense for substantial understatements with respect 
to tax shelters.
83
 
The final result on the strict liability front after the enactment of H.R. 
7872 is the following: 
Any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a 
 
 78. See H.R. 4872, § 1409(b)(1-3) (adding new I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6) and 6662(i)).  The 
legislation clarifies that the new penalty cannot be combined with other accuracy-related 
penalties. 
 79. Id. 
 80. JCX-18-10, supra note 70, at 155 n. 359.  The “any similar rule of law” language 
introduces additional uncertainty as to the proper application of the penalty, the discussion 
of which is beyond the scope of this Article.  For example, it is unclear if the “step 
transaction” or “sham” doctrines would constitute a similar rule of law.  Silverman & 
Varma, supra note 71, at 357 (noting the lack of clarity as to what constitutes a similar rule 
of law and proposing that such language be removed from the statute). 
 81. H.R. 4872, § 1409(c)(1). 
 82. I.R.C. § 6664(d) (West 2010). 
 83. H.R. 4872, § 1409(c)(2).  Additionally, the new legislation provides that an 
excessive claim for a refund which is attributable to a transaction that lacks economic 
substance will be subject to the twenty percent penalty under I.R.C. § 6676(a) and the 
reasonable basis exception is not available.  Id. at § 1409(d). 
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transaction lacking economic substance within the meaning of 
new I.R.C. § 7701(o) is subject to strict liability. 
A gross valuation misstatement penalty is still subject to the 
regular reasonable cause and good faith defense. 
A substantial understatement with respect to a tax shelter is 
still subject to the same heightened reasonable cause and good 
faith defense. 
A reportable transaction understatement is still subject to the 
same heightened reasonable cause and good faith defense, unless 
the tax benefits are disallowed because the transaction lacks 
economic substance (in which case strict liability applies). 
B. Reactions to the New Strict Liability Penalty 
Congress has advanced a number of justifications for the new strict 
liability penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine.  These 
arguments focus mainly on deterrence and the inherent disadvantage to the 
IRS in economic substance doctrine cases due to the complexity of the 
transactions.  On the other side of the debate, many tax scholars and 
practitioners have vigorously opposed the new strict liability penalty. 
1. Arguments in Favor of a Strict Liability Penalty 
a. Deterrence 
The Senate Finance Committee has reasoned that a stronger penalty 
imposed on transactions that lack economic substance will deter taxpayers 
from entering into such transactions and thus promote compliance.
84
  It has 
also been suggested that a harsher penalty is justified in this context 
because the lack of IRS resources to litigate cases may lead to settlements 
that are not sufficiently detrimental to taxpayers to deter them from 
entering into transactions that lack economic substance.
85
 
Proponents also point out that, under the current penalty regime, a 
taxpayer may completely avoid penalties and pay nothing but the tax owed 
plus interest if the taxpayer obtains an opinion from an advisor that 
concludes the position is more likely than not to prevail.
86
  As a result, 
members of Congress have argued that a strict liability penalty “level[s] the 
playing field” between more aggressive and more conservative tax planners 
by forcing planners and taxpayers to focus on the potential downside if 
 
 84. Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture Act of 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-206, at 
114 (2007). 
 85. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 63. 
 86. Id. at n. 201. 
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their position is not sustained on the merits.
87
  It has also been suggested 
that the strict liability penalty further “adds to the IRS‟s existing deterrence 
abilities” because it would apply both to transactions that would fall under 
the current definition of reportable transactions, and to transactions that 
have not yet been identified as abusive by the IRS.
88
 
The deterrence argument has accompanied the enactment of all of the 
tax shelter penalties, and it doesn‟t appear that anything new has been 
offered in the case of the economic substance penalty.  For example, the 
argument that taxpayers who successfully avoid penalties end up paying 
nothing more than tax and interest, and therefore have no motivation to 
avoid abusive transactions, was advanced in the early 1980s when the 
substantial understatement penalty was enacted.
89
  The arguments 
supporting the new economic substance penalty fail to explain whether a 
stronger penalty is now needed because the current accuracy-related 
penalties have failed to adequately deter taxpayers from participating in tax 
shelters.  If that is the case, then it appears a complete overhaul of the 
accuracy-related penalty regime may be in order.  If that is not the case, 
then proponents have failed to explain why the deterrence needs for 
violations of the economic substance doctrine are unique vis-à-vis 
transactions covered by other tax shelter penalties.
90
 
b. Complexity 
Those in favor of the strict liability penalty have also asserted that 
economic substance doctrine cases often involve complex, “highly 
structured” transactions, where the taxpayer is the only party with access to 
and an understanding of all of the facts.
91
  These cases often turn on 
extensive expert testimony or discovery on issues such as the profit 
potential of a specific transaction.
92
  It has thus been argued that “such 
structured transactions are appropriately subject to a strict liability penalty 
that cannot be avoided by the presence of a tax opinion.”
93
  Additionally, 
 
 87. Id. at n. 202 (statement of Samuel Thomson, Jr., before the Subcommittee on Select 
Revenue Measures of the House Committee on Ways and Means, May 9, 2006). 
 88. Id. at 68. 
 89. See S. REP. NO. 97-494(i), supra note 31, at 223 (noting that existing law did not 
adequately deter abusive transactions since the only penalties were tax and interest). 
 90. One commentator has argued that creating a harsher penalty for violations of the 
economic substance doctrine does not necessarily deter tax shelters more effectively, “as [a] 
taxpayer may still hedge his bets” that he will win his claim on the merits.  Mik Shin-Li, 
Strictly Wrong as a Tax Policy: The Strict Liability Standard in Noneconomic Substance 
Transactions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2046 (2010). 
 91. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64, 68. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 65. 
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proponents of the penalty have pointed out that, in applying the current 
accuracy-related penalties for reportable transactions, “there is little 
experience to date as to how the „strengthened reasonable cause‟ 
requirements will be applied to particular facts” in these complex economic 
substance doctrine cases.
94
 
The complex transactions argument is reminiscent of the argument 
that a bright line penalty was needed to address the difficult and fact-
intensive valuation issues of “more than routine significance” that preceded 
the enactment of the valuation misstatement penalty.
95
  Like the deterrence 
argument, the argument that highly structured transactions are 
appropriately subject to strict liability fails to differentiate between 
transactions that are found to fail the economic substance doctrine and 
equally complex (or identical) transactions that might be found to violate a 
substantive provision of the Internal Revenue Code.
96
  Modern day tax 
shelters are almost universally complex, and if complexity is hindering the 
IRS‟s ability to successfully litigate tax shelter cases, this again calls for 
broader changes to the entire accuracy-penalty regime, rather than a special 
rule that would only aid the IRS in cases where the transaction is 
disallowed due to the economic substance doctrine. 
Proponents are correct in noting that there is “little experience to date” 
as to how the strengthened reasonable cause requirements enacted in 2004 
will play out in tax shelter cases, since the economic substance doctrine 
cases to date have generally involved tax years prior to 2004.
97
  However, 
the fact that there has not been time to adequately study the effect of the 
most recent tax shelter penalty legislation only highlights the fact that the 
strict liability penalty is premature, and possibly unnecessary in light of the 
current accuracy-related penalties. 
 
 94. Id. at 68 n. 224. 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201 at 243 (1981); see also supra text accompanying note 20. 
 96. For example, in Maguire Partners-Master Investments, LLC v. U.S., the court held 
that the taxpayer‟s tax shelter lacked economic substance, but that even if the economic 
substance doctrine did not apply, the taxpayer‟s claimed benefits were virtually eliminated 
under I.R.C. § 752 or Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6. No. CV 06-07371-JFW(RZx), 2009 WL 
4907033, at *17-19 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009). 
 97. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64, 68.  To date, no economic substance doctrine cases 
have involved the reportable transaction understatement penalty, which is effective only for 
tax years ending after October 22, 2004.  American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-357, § 812(f), 118 Stat. 1418, 1580.  See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 
537 (tax years 2000-2002); Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (tax year 2002); Palm Canyon, 98 
T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (tax year 2001); Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (tax year 
2001); Consolidated Edison Co. v. U.S., 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009) (tax year 1997); TIFD III-E 
Inc. v. U.S., 660 F.Supp.2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009) (tax years 1997 and 1998); Schering-
Plough, 651 F.Supp.2d 219 (tax years 1991 and 1992); see also supra text accompanying 
note 64. 
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2. Arguments Against a Strict Liability Penalty 
a. Fairness 
Despite the justifications proffered by legislators, the strict liability 
penalty has been roundly criticized by scholars and practitioners alike for 
being unfair and disproportionate.
98
  What has been described as the “most 
obvious” argument against strict liability is that it unfairly punishes 
taxpayers who have made good faith attempts to comply with the law.  The 
absence of a reasonable cause exception prohibits these taxpayers from 
introducing evidence of any mitigating circumstances that might otherwise 
lead a court or the IRS to conclude that the penalty should not apply.
99
 
Additionally, many opponents of the penalty have argued that strict 
liability is particularly unfair and inappropriate in the context of the 
economic substance doctrine.  Whereas strict liability may be appropriate 
in certain narrow, clearly defined situations, commentators have noted that 
application of the economic substance doctrine involves a great deal of 
ambiguity, such as how to define the objective and subjective prongs, and 
when application of the doctrine is even relevant.
100
  Indeed, the doctrine 
applies even when the substantive provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which more clearly define taxpayer behavior, do not apply to a transaction. 
 
 98. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, New York State Bar Association Submits Comments on 
Modifications to House Healthcare Bill, 2009 TNT 182-25 (Sept. 22, 2009) (LEXIS) 
[hereinafter NY Bar Submits Comments] (citing Letter from Erika W. Nijenhuis, Chair, 
New York State Bar Association, to Senate Finance Committee Chairman Baucus and 
Ranking Member Grassley and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rangel and 
Ranking Member Camp (Sept. 22, 2009)); Tax Analysts, AICPA Calls for Reform of Civil 
Tax Penalty System, 2009 TNT 166-76 (Aug. 31, 2009) (LEXIS) (citing AMERICAN 
INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES: THE NEED 
FOR REFORM (Aug. 28, 2009)) [hereinafter REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES]; Tax Analysts, 
ABA Tax Section Comments on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, 2007 TNT 
72-22 (Apr. 12, 2007) (LEXIS) (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION, 
PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE (Apr. 12, 2007)) 
[hereinafter ABA Proposed Codification]; Lawrence M. Hill & Alexandra Minkovich, Tax 
Policy Gone Wild: Harsh Penalties as Revenue Raisers, 115 TAX NOTES 79 (2007); David 
S. Miller, An Alternative to Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 123 TAX 
NOTES 747 (2009); Silverman & Varma, supra note 71; Clinton Stretch et al., Economic 
Substance and Strict Liability Do Not Mix, 123 TAX NOTES 1357 (2009). 
 99. Stretch et al., supra note 98, at 1359. 
 100. See, e.g., ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98, at 10; REPORT ON CIVIL TAX 
PENALTIES, supra note 98, at 3, 7; Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 81; Stretch et al., 
supra note 98, at 1360.  For example, it has been noted that the proposal to apply the penalty 
to violations of the economic substance doctrine or “any similar rule of law” exacerbates 
this inherent ambiguity. ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98, at 11; see also supra 
text accompanying note 70; supra text accompanying note 80. 
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b. Adverse Effects on Taxpayer Behavior 
Other opponents have pointed out potential adverse effects on 
taxpayer behavior, suggesting that the severity of the penalty may over-
deter taxpayers and cause them to avoid legitimate transactions.
101
  A 
taxpayer with a legally defensible position may ultimately decide to 
abandon a business transaction for fear of being automatically subjected to 
a strict liability penalty if the IRS asserts that the economic substance 
doctrine is applicable.
102
 
It has further been argued that the strict liability aspect of the penalty 
may actually discourage taxpayers from disclosing transactions, making it 
harder for the IRS to detect tax shelters.
103
  Aggressive taxpayers may 
determine that the benefit from disclosure, i.e. a reduction in the penalty 
rate from 40 percent to 20 percent, is too small of a benefit compared to the 
potential benefit of avoiding detection, and thus a penalty, altogether.
104
 
Opponents also argue that the severity of the penalty may lead to 
increased taxpayer incentives to litigate when the IRS raises the economic 
substance doctrine, which in turn burdens IRS and judicial resources.
105
  
Since the taxpayer will be subject to the penalty in every case in which it 
concedes, there is little incentive not to challenge the case on substantive 
grounds.
106
  
c. Enforcement Issues 
Others fear that courts might be reluctant to impose the penalty due to 
its severity and, thus, may be reluctant to find that economic substance is 
lacking in cases where the doctrine is appropriate.
107
  The IRS has also 
criticized the legislation for creating a penalty that will be difficult to 
enforce,
108
 and it has been suggested that the administration of the new 
 
 101. E.g., JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64; Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 81; Stretch 
et al., supra note 98, at 1361-62. 
 102. Stretch et al., supra note 98, at 1362.  For example, it has been argued that 
taxpayers may be improperly deterred from commonly accepted tax planning choices, such 
as the choice to do business through a partnership. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 65. 
 103. Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 81. 
 104. ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98, at 12. 
 105. E.g., JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64; ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98, at 
11; Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 82; Stretch et al., supra note 98, at 1359. 
 106. Id. 
 107. JCS-3-09, supra note 7, at 64-65, 67; Hill & Minkovich, supra note 98, at 80; 
Miller, supra note 98, at 748; Stretch et al., supra note 98, at 1359. 
 108. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, Korb Notes Declining Revenue Estimate for Economic 
Substance Codification, 2007 TNT 212-6 (Nov. 1, 2007) (LEXIS) [hereinafter Tax Analysts 
I]. 
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penalty would be a drain on IRS resources.
109
  
d.  Motivated by Revenue 
Finally, some commentators have also suggested that despite the 
deterrence rationale offered by Congress, the true motivation behind 
codification of the economic substance doctrine and the strict liability 
penalty is to raise revenue, which is often viewed as “an unsatisfactory 
rationale”
 110
 for penalty legislation.
111
  It has been suggested that one of the 
main reasons Congress continued to include proposals to codify the 
economic substance doctrine in its bills was to help pay for them.
112
  The 
Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that codification of the economic 
substance doctrine would raise revenue of $4.5 billion between 2010 and 
2019.
113
  Although it is unclear how much of this estimate is attributable to 
the strict liability penalty, it is logical to assume that most of the revenue 
would be derived from the new penalty, since the legislation otherwise 
merely codified an existing judicial doctrine that the IRS already had at its 
disposal.
114
 
 
 109. ABA Proposed Codification, supra note 98 at 11; Stretch et al., supra note 98 at 
1359. 
 110. Hill and Minkovich, supra note 98, at 79. 
 111. REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98, at 1, 4; Stretch et al., supra note 
98, at 1361; Ventry, supra note 71, at 1410.  The IRS‟s Penalty Handbook also states that 
while penalties do bring additional revenues into the Treasury, these results are “not reasons 
for creating or imposing penalties.”  INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 20.1.1.2 (Feb. 22, 
2008), available at  http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-001r.html#d0e406. 
 112. Donald L. Korb, Codification of the Judicial Economic Substance Doctrine, 852 
PLI/TAX 377, 395 (2008). 
 113. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-17-10, ESTIMATED REVENUE 
EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4872, THE 
“RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010” (as amended) (Comm. Print 2010), available at 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3672.  The revenue estimates for 
codification of the economic substance doctrine have been steadily declining. In 2009, the 
estimate was approximately $7 billion over ten years, and in 2005 the estimate was 
approximately $16 billion over 10 years.  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-
28-09, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE 
PRESIDENT‟S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL (Comm. Print 2009), available at 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3558; JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-82-05, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE TAX PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN S. 2020, THE TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2005 (Comm. Print 2005), available at 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1533. 
 114. In criticizing codification for being driven by revenue concerns, then-IRS Chief 
Counsel Donald Korb stated that “[a]ll the money is in the penalties.”  Tax Analysts, Korb 
Slams Textron Ruling, Wall Street Rule, Senate Economic Substance Bill, 2007 TNT 197-3 
(Oct. 11, 2007). 
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3. Putting the Penalty in Perspective 
The most notable aspect of the economic substance penalty is that it 
provides for strict liability, and this has been the focus of the commentary 
surrounding the penalty.  What most critiques of the legislation have not 
done is stop to query whether there is any need for a separate penalty for 
violations of the economic substance doctrine at all, strict liability aside.
115
  
Part IV of this Article will explore this question and conclude that a 
separate penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine is 
unjustified.  Part V will then explore the strict liability aspect of the penalty 
and conclude that it is similarly unjustified because there is no qualitative 
difference between transactions that violate the economic substance 
doctrine and transactions covered by other tax shelter penalties, for which a 
reasonable cause defense is available. 
IV. ADDING A FOURTH ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTY TO THE CURRENT 
TAX SHELTER REGIME 
This part argues against a separate economic substance penalty in light 
of the current penalties applicable to tax shelters.  The economic substance 
penalty results in substantial overlap with the other tax shelter penalties.  
The current penalties have been consistently sustained by courts in 
economic substance doctrine cases, obviating the need for an additional 
penalty.  Congress has not identified what types of transactions it intends to 
capture with the new economic substance penalty that are not covered by 
the current tax shelter penalties. 
If the sole justification for the new penalty is strict liability, then the 
same result could have been accomplished by amending the current tax 
shelter penalties to remove the taxpayer defenses.  Adding an economic 
substance penalty to the list of tax shelter penalties creates significant and 
unnecessary complexity in an already confusing penalty regime, making it 
difficult for taxpayers to understand and predict the consequences of their 
behavior. 
A. Overlap with Other Tax Shelter Penalties Creates Undue Complexity 
Are violations of the economic substance doctrine falling through the 
 
 115. Commentators often assert that a reasonable cause exception should be added to the 
proposed legislation.  See, e.g., Stretch et al., supra note 98.  But see REPORT ON CIVIL TAX 
PENALTIES, supra note 98, at 14 (recommending a comprehensive study of current tax 
shelter penalties in lieu of a strict liability penalty for violations of the economic substance 
doctrine); Shin-Li, supra note 90, at 2048 (arguing that the current penalty regime is 
sufficient to address the tax shelter problem). 
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cracks of the current accuracy-related penalty regime, calling for a new 
penalty that specifically addresses transactions that fall under the doctrine?  
This is a question that does not appear to have been addressed by 
legislators and other advocates of the new economic substance penalty. 
1. Past Experience Shows that the Current Penalty Regime Is 
Adequate 
An examination of recent cases in which courts have applied the 
economic substance doctrine reveals that the government has more than 
enough accuracy-related penalties at its disposal and that it has been 
successful in asserting these penalties against the taxpayer in cases in 
which the government prevails on the merits. 
For example, out of eight economic substance doctrine cases in which 
the government prevailed in 2009, penalties were sustained in four of the 
cases, while the taxpayer successfully defeated penalty assertions in only 
two cases.
116
  The government has successfully asserted penalties in a 
number of high profile economic substance doctrine cases prior to 2009, as 
well.
117
  In economic substance doctrine cases where taxpayers have 
successfully fended off penalties, they generally have been able to 
demonstrate reasonable cause or substantial authority.
118
  Except in the 
cases in which courts, adopting the minority view, have determined that the 
gross valuation misstatement penalty is inapplicable to violations of the 
economic substance doctrine,
119
 courts have not held that the current 
accuracy-related penalties are inapplicable to violations of the economic 
substance doctrine.  Further, even in the minority of economic substance 
doctrine cases where the gross valuation misstatement penalty was found to 
 
 116. For cases sustaining penalties, see Palm Canyon, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574; 
Clearmeadow Investments, 87 Fed. Cl. 509; New Phoenix Sunrise Corp., 132 T.C. No. 9; 
and Maguire Partners-Master Investments, 2009 WL 4907033.  The taxpayer successfully 
defeated penalties in Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund and Southgate Master Fund LLC v. U.S., 
651 F. Supp. 2d 596 (N.D. Tex. 2009).  Additionally, in two other cases in which the 
government prevailed on economic substance in 2009, penalties were not discussed or were 
not asserted.  Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (penalties not asserted) and 
Schering-Plough, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219 (penalties not discussed). 
 117. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Investments LLC v. U.S., 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008); Cemco 
Investors LLC v. U.S., 2007 WL 951944 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 
2008); Long Term Capital Holdings v. U.S., 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 
2005-2 USTC ¶50,575 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 118. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 537 (finding that taxpayer 
satisfied substantial authority and reasonable belief that treatment was more likely than not a 
correct defense for the substantial understatement penalty for a tax shelter transaction) and 
Southgate Master Fund LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (finding that taxpayer had substantial 
authority and satisfied reasonable cause and good faith). 
 119. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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be inapplicable, other accuracy-related penalties have been sustained in the 
alternative.
120
  Thus, there is no indication that the current penalty regime 
has been inadequate in past economic substance doctrine cases. 
2. Conceptually, the Current Penalties Should Continue to Apply 
These results are not surprising, as there do not appear to be 
transactions that would fall under the economic substance doctrine that are 
not covered by at least one, if not all, of the other tax shelter penalties.  
Many transactions that lack economic substance would constitute a gross 
valuation misstatement, a tax shelter for purposes of the substantial 
understatement penalty, and would also constitute a reportable transaction. 
a. Gross Valuation Misstatement 
When Congress enacted the valuation misstatement penalty in the 
early 1980s, the typical tax shelter scheme often involved an ostensible 
purchase of a depreciable asset in a transaction in which the taxpayer made 
a minimal equity investment and obtained the benefit of depreciation 
deductions, interest deductions, and possibly an investment tax credit.
121
  
These transactions easily lent themselves to application of the valuation 
misstatement penalty, as was intended by Congress in enacting the 
penalty.
122
  Taxpayers relied on the basis claimed in the purchased asset for 
depreciation and investment tax credits, and that basis was reduced to zero 
when the ostensible sale was nullified, which automatically satisfied the 
threshold for a valuation misstatement for courts taking the majority 
approach.
123
 
Although the nature of tax shelters has evolved since the 1980s, more 
recent economic substance doctrine cases still tend to involve transactions 
in which the taxpayer relies on an inflated basis to obtain tax benefits, often 
a deductible loss.
124
  Given that the majority of courts and the IRS take the 
position that violations of the economic substance doctrine result in a gross 
 
 120. E.g., Keller, 556 F.3d at 1056. 
 121. See, e.g., Massengill, 876 F.2d at 616 (denying depreciation deductions and 
investment tax credit on cattle purchase and upholding valuation misstatement penalty). 
 122. H.R. REP. NO. 97-201 at 243. 
 123. E.g., Massengill, 876 F.2d at 616 and Zirker v. Comm‟r, 87 T.C. 970 (1986) 
(involving the depreciation of cattle). 
 124. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 537 (claiming taxpayer loss 
based on inflated basis in partnership interest); Jade Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 11 (claiming 
taxpayer loss based on inflated basis in partnership interest); H.J. Heinz Co. v. U.S., 76 Fed. 
Cl. 570 (2007) (claiming taxpayer loss based on artificially high basis in stock of its parent); 
Long Term Capital Holdings v. U.S., 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 2005-2 
USTC ¶50,575 (2d Cir. 2005) (claiming taxpayer loss on sale of high basis preferred stock). 
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valuation misstatement,
125
 this penalty should continue to be a powerful 
weapon in tax shelter cases.  This is particularly true because, unlike the 
substantial understatement and reportable transaction understatement 
penalties, the rate on the gross valuation misstatement penalty is 40 
percent, the same as the maximum rate on the new economic substance 
penalty. 
b. Substantial Understatement with Respect to a Tax Shelter 
An even bigger overlap appears to exist between transactions that 
violate the economic substance doctrine and transactions that meet the 
broad definition of “tax shelter” for purposes of the substantial 
understatement penalty under I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C).  Any economic 
substance doctrine case will likely involve a deficiency large enough to 
constitute a substantial understatement,
126
 and the issue would be only 
whether the transaction constitutes a tax shelter under I.R.C. § 
6662(d)(2)(C), such that the taxpayer‟s defenses to the penalty would be 
limited.
127
 
A tax shelter is defined for this purpose as a partnership or other 
entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or 
arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan or 
arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.
128
  In the 
case of the economic substance doctrine, as recently codified, a taxpayer 
has violated the doctrine if the transaction lacks either objective economic 
substance or a subjective business purpose.
129
 
Under the new legislation, a court could find that a transaction failed 
the economic substance doctrine solely because it lacked a business 
purpose, without ever having to decide the issue of objective economic 
substance.  Additionally, in many cases in which a court has determined 
that a transaction lacks objective substance, the court also concludes 
(unsurprisingly) that the taxpayer did not have a subjective business 
purpose.
130
  If a taxpayer‟s transaction fails the subjective prong of the 
economic substance doctrine because it has no non-tax business purpose, 
 
 125. See supra notes 57 and 66 and accompanying text. 
 126. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1) (West 2010). 
 127. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(2)(C) (West 2010), 
6664(c)(1) (West 2010). 
 128. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (West 2010). 
 129. H.R. 4872, § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2) (West 2010). 
 130. It is not surprising, for example, that a transaction resulting in negative cash flows 
lacks a valid, non-tax business purpose.  See, e.g., Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410.   
Many economic substance doctrine cases involve transactions that fail both prongs of the 
test, including the subjective prong.  See, e.g., Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. 35; Palm Canyon, 
98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574; and Schering-Plough, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219. 
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this would surely meet the lower threshold of having a “significant 
purpose” of tax avoidance under I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C).  Accordingly, the 
substantial understatement penalty for tax shelters should pick up a large 
number, if not the majority, of these cases.
131
 
c. Reportable Transaction Understatement 
The reportable transaction understatement penalty is still untested in 
the context of economic substance doctrine cases.
132
  However, because it 
was specifically drafted to address tax shelter transactions,
133
 the penalty 
should also cover a significant number of economic substance doctrine 
cases that involve tax years ending after October 22, 2004.
134
  Reportable 
transactions include listed transactions, confidential transactions, 
transactions with contractual protection, loss transactions, and transactions 
of interest.
135
  These categories encompass common features of tax shelter 
transactions, many of which have been the subject of economic substance 
doctrine cases. 
For example, a “confidential transaction” is one offered to a taxpayer 
under conditions of confidentiality and for which a taxpayer pays a 
minimum fee to an advisor.
136
  This describes the taxpayer‟s arrangement in 
Stobie Creek Investments v. United States, in which the Court of Federal 
Claims held that the taxpayer‟s transaction lacked economic substance.
137
  
In sustaining accuracy-related penalties in the case, the court concluded 
that the reasonableness of the taxpayer‟s reliance on an opinion of counsel 
was diminished because of clear conflict of interest, which was due to 
“[t]he proprietary nature of the confidentiality agreements required by [the 
law firm] and the calculation of the fee for its Tax Opinion based on a 
percentage of the gains to be sheltered . . . .”
138
 
Additionally, a number of economic substance doctrine cases have 
constituted, and inevitably will continue to constitute, loss transactions.  A 
loss transaction is a transaction in which a taxpayer claims a loss under 
 
 131. On the other hand, a transaction that meets the subjective business purpose prong 
but fails the objective economic substance prong would lack economic substance under the 
codified rules, but would not necessarily constitute a tax shelter under the substantial 
understatement rules. 
 132. See supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text. 
 133. H.R. REP. NO. 108-393, at 183 (2003). 
 134. To be subject to the reportable transaction understatement penalty under I.R.C. § 
6662A, a taxpayer‟s reportable transaction must have a significant purpose of tax avoidance, 
unless the transaction is a listed transaction.  I.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2) (West 2010). 
 135. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2010). 
 136. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 2010). 
 137. 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008). 
 138. Id. at 715. 
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I.R.C. § 165 of at least $10 million in a single year in the case of a 
corporation (or partnership with corporate partners), or a loss of at least $2 
million in a single year in the case of an individual.
139
  The stakes in 
litigated economic substance doctrine cases will often meet these dollar 
thresholds.  Further, as discussed in the context of the valuation 
misstatement penalty, recent tax shelters at issue in economic substance 
doctrine cases often tend to involve transactions in which the taxpayer 
claims a deductible loss under I.R.C. § 165.
140
  Although there is a safe 
harbor under Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) that protects losses when a taxpayer 
has a “qualified basis,” this safe harbor generally requires that the 
taxpayer‟s basis be derived from a cash outlay by the taxpayer.
141
  In 
contrast, most tax shelters at issue in economic substance doctrine cases 
involve only a minimal equity investment by the taxpayer.
142
  
Finally, a number of tax shelters that have been the subject of 
economic substance doctrine cases are listed transactions, some of which 
had already been identified by the IRS before the tax year at issue in the 
case.
143
  This overlap between reportable transactions and tax shelters that 
violate the economic substance doctrine demonstrates that the reportable 
transaction understatement penalty, with its restricted taxpayer defenses, 
should be an effective tool in economic substance doctrine cases going 
forward. 
3. A Hypothetical Analysis of Three Recent Cases 
The above analysis indicates that the current tax shelter penalties are 
sufficient to cover most, if not all, economic substance doctrine cases, 
making an additional economic substance penalty redundant and confusing.  
This has been true historically, can be demonstrated conceptually based on 
the common features of tax shelter transactions, and should continue to 
play out in practice going forward.  This last point can be illustrated by an 
 
 139. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5) (as amended in 2010). 
 140. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 124. 
 141. Rev. Proc. 2004-66, 2004-2 C.B. 966. 
 142. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, 568 F.3d at 541-42 (taxpayers made equity 
investment of $1.5 million and claimed loss of approximately $25 million). 
 143. A listed transaction is a type of reportable transaction that has been specifically 
identified by the IRS as a tax avoidance transaction.  I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d), 6707A(c)(2) 
(West 2010).  See, e.g., Clearmeadow Investments, 87 Fed. Cl. 509; New Phoenix Sunrise 
Corp., 132 T.C. 161; Maguire Partners-Master Investments, LLC v. U.S., No. CV 06-
07371-JFW(RZx), 2009 WL 4907033, at *17-19 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (all involving 
the same listed transaction, which was identified by the IRS in I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, cited 
infra note 159).  Each of the above-mentioned cases involves tax years after the issuance of 
I.R.S. Notice 2000-44.  See Monte A. Jackel & Robert J. Crnkovich, Son-of-BOSS Revisited, 
123 TAX NOTES 1481 (2009) (surveying various cases involving Son-of-BOSS litigation that 
occurred after the issuance of I.R.S. Notice 2000-44). 
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examination of three recent economic substance doctrine decisions.  
Although penalties were raised in only one of these cases, an examination 
of the tax shelters at issue illustrates how the current penalty regime is 
more than adequate. 
a. Wells Fargo: The SILO Tax Shelter 
In Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims 
held that the taxpayer‟s sale in/lease out (“SILO”) transaction lacked 
economic substance.
144
  In a typical SILO transaction, the taxpayer enters 
into a purported sale-leaseback transaction with a tax exempt entity, under 
which the tax exempt entity sells property to the taxpayer and the taxpayer 
immediately leases the property back to the tax exempt entity.
145
  The lease 
provides for rental payments, and substantially all of the purchase price is 
set aside by the tax-exempt entity to fund its lease obligations.
146
  The 
taxpayer makes a minor equity investment and funds most of the purchase 
price with nonrecourse debt, the interest deductions on which offset the 
rental income it receives under the lease.
147
  At the end of the lease term, 
the taxpayer generally has the option to either sell the property back to the 
tax exempt entity at a fixed price, or to impose a service contract on the tax 
exempt entity under which the taxpayer is reimbursed for its costs and is 
guaranteed a minimum after-tax rate of return on its equity investment.
148
  
The taxpayer is generally shielded from economic risk by this arrangement, 
and benefits during the lease term through taking depreciation deductions 
on the property (in addition to the interest deductions on the nonrecourse 
loan).
149
 
Wells Fargo entered into a number of SILO transactions with various 
public transit agencies, in which it leased depreciable assets such as rail 
cars, locomotives, or buses.
150
  The court employed the majority test for 
economic substance and held that Wells Fargo was not entitled to interest 
or depreciation deductions unless it could prove its SILO transactions had 
 
 144. 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010). 
 145. I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, 2005-1 C.B. 630.  The initial sale may be in the form of a 
lease of the property with a term that is longer than the remaining useful life of the property, 
which the parties treat as a sale for tax purposes.  Id. 
 146. Id.  The tax exempt entity also retains an amount that represents a fee as an 
inducement to enter into the transaction. 
 147. Id.  In reality, the interest and rental payments are often not made, but are recorded 
as offsetting book entries.  See Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. at 39-40. 
 148. See supra note 145.  The tax exempt entity‟s obligations are generally funded by the 
equity portion of the purchase price paid by the taxpayer.  See Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. at 
41. 
 149. I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, supra note 145. 
 150. Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. at 37. 
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both objective economic substance and a subjective business purpose.
151
  
The court held the transactions lacked objective economic substance 
because the only non-tax benefit Wells Fargo received was a return of its 
equity investment with interest.
152
  The court also held that Wells Fargo 
lacked a non-tax business purpose and that it wouldn‟t have entered into 
the transactions but for the tax benefits.
153
  Accordingly, Wells Fargo‟s 
transactions were found to fail the economic substance doctrine and the 
related tax deductions were denied. 
Penalties were not discussed in the Wells Fargo case.  The case also 
involved the 2002 tax year, before the effective date of the reportable 
transaction understatement penalty.  However, based on the facts of the 
transaction alone, all of the current accuracy-related tax shelter penalties 
could have applied in this case.
154
  Like the earlier tax shelters of the 1980s 
that relied on an ostensible sale to obtain depreciation deductions,
155
 the 
depreciation deductions obtained by Wells Fargo in the transaction 
depended upon the basis it obtained through its purported purchase of the 
transportation assets.  Because the transaction was ultimately disregarded 
under the economic substance doctrine, the IRS could have asserted that 
the correct basis in the assets was zero, resulting in a gross valuation 
misstatement. 
Additionally, because the court determined that Wells Fargo lacked a 
non-tax purpose for entering into the transaction, the transaction likely 
would satisfy the definition of a tax shelter for purposes of the substantial 
understatement rules.  Further, the reportable transaction understatement 
penalty could have been asserted
156
 because SILO transactions are listed 
transactions.
157
 
b. Palm Canyon:  The Son-of-BOSS Tax Shelter 
In Palm Canyon X Investments v. Commissioner,
158
 the Tax Court 
found that the taxpayer‟s “Son-of-BOSS”
159
 tax shelter lacked economic 
 
 151. Id. at 81. 
 152. Id. at 82. 
 153. Id. at 83. 
 154. This is assuming that the taxpayer could not meet the reasonable cause or other 
relevant defenses for the penalties. 
 155. See, e.g., Massengill, 876 F.2d 616 (denying depreciation deductions and 
investment tax credit on cattle purchase and upholding valuation misstatement penalty). 
 156. This is assuming the tax year at issue was after the transaction was listed, and after 
the enactment of the reportable transaction rules in 2004. 
 157. I.R.S. Notice 2005-13, supra note 145.  A compilation of all listed transactions is 
available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html. 
 158. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009). 
 159. These tax shelters grew out of and resemble an earlier tax shelter termed “BOSS” 
(Bond and Option Sales Strategy), leading to the name “Son-of-BOSS.”  See I.R.S. Notice 
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substance.  The Son-of-BOSS shelter has multiple variations, all of which 
revolve around creating an artificially high basis in a partnership interest 
and subsequently disposing of that interest at a loss.
160
  Under one common 
variation, the taxpayer borrows at a premium and contributes the proceeds 
to a partnership, with the partnership assuming the debt.
161
  The taxpayer 
takes the position that when the debt is assumed, its basis in its partnership 
interest is reduced only by the principal amount of the debt under I.R.C. § 
752,
162
 but not by the additional amount of the loan proceeds that represent 
the premium.
163
  When the taxpayer disposes of its partnership interest, it 
takes a loss in the amount of its basis, although its actual cash outlay in the 
transaction was zero or close to zero.
164
 
In Palm Canyon, the taxpayer entered into another common Son-of-
BOSS variation in which the taxpayer enters into offsetting foreign 
currency options that are contributed to a partnership.
165
  The taxpayer took 
the position that its basis was only offset by the long option, but that the 
short option was too speculative to constitute a “liability” for purposes of 
I.R.C. § 752.
166
  As in all Son-of-BOSS transactions, the ultimate result for 
the taxpayer was a tax loss with only nominal economic outlay.
167
  The Tax 
Court held that the transaction lacked economic substance, concluding that 
the taxpayer did not have a legitimate non-tax business purpose for entering 
into the transaction, and that the transaction lacked pretax profit 
potential.
168
 
The Tax Court held that the gross valuation misstatement penalty 
applied, or, in the alternative, that the transaction resulted in a substantial 
understatement subject to the tax shelter rules, or was subject to the 
negligence penalty.
169
  As is the case for any Son-of-BOSS transaction, the 
tax benefits in the case were derived from the taxpayer‟s basis in its 
 
2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/notice_2000-
44.pdf.; I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761. 
 160. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 159. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Under I.R.C. § 752 (West 1954) (as amended in 1986), an assumption of a partner‟s 
liability by a partnership is treated as a cash distribution to that partner, which reduces its 
basis in its partnership interest. 
 163. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 159. 
 164. Id. 
 165. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, at *4, *14. 
 166. Id. at *14.  See also Lee A. Sheppard, Recent Shelter Cases: The Right Result For 
The Wrong Reasons, 126 TAX NOTES 421, 426 (2010) (describing the Son-of-BOSS 
transaction at issue in the Palm Canyon case). 
 167. Palm Canyon, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, at *14. 
 168. Id. at *27.  The Tax Court did not have to determine whether a conjunctive or 
disjunctive test for economic substance was appropriate because it found that neither prong 
was satisfied.  Id. at *19. 
 169. Id. at *29-*36. 
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partnership interest, which, when reduced to zero, resulted in a gross 
valuation misstatement.  Additionally, the tax shelter rules for substantial 
understatements applied “[b]ecause the sole purpose of the . . . transaction 
was tax avoidance.”
170
  Finally, the transaction would have constituted a 
reportable transaction on at least two grounds.  Not only is the Son-of-
BOSS tax shelter a listed transaction,
171
 but the transaction resulted in a 
claimed loss of approximately $5 million dollars, which would have likely 
satisfied the requirements for a loss transaction.
172
 
c. Country Pine: The CARDS Tax Shelter 
Country Pine Finance v. Commissioner
173
 involved the Custom 
Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (“CARDS”) tax shelter.  In a typical 
CARDS transaction, a tax neutral party (such as a foreign entity not subject 
to U.S. taxation) incurs long-term debt from a lender and uses the proceeds 
to purchase assets such as short-term deposits or government bonds.
174
  The 
taxpayer enters into a separate agreement with the tax neutral entity under 
which the taxpayer receives a portion of the purchased assets in exchange 
for the taxpayer‟s agreement to become co-obligor on the loan.
175
  The fair 
market value of the assets transferred to the taxpayer is substantially less 
than the principal amount of the debt for which the taxpayer has agreed to 
become jointly and severally liable.
176
  The taxpayer claims that its 
assumption of liability on the debt gives it a basis equal to the entire 
principal amount of the debt, and subsequently disposes of the assets at a 
loss.
177
 
The Tax Court held that Country Pine‟s transaction lacked economic 
substance and disallowed the claimed loss.
178
  The court found that the 
 
 170. Id. at *35. 
 171. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 159. 
 172. The $5 million dollar loss was claimed by Thighmaster World Corp., an S 
corporation, which is subject to the $2 million threshold for loss transactions under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5)(D).  Palm Canyon, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, at *11.  To be subject to 
I.R.C. § 6662A as a non-listed reportable transaction, the transaction must have tax 
avoidance as a significant purpose, a requirement which would have been satisfied based on 
the court‟s finding in this case. 
 173. 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 (2009). 
 174. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730 (describing the mechanics of the 
“CARDS” tax shelter). 
 175. Id.  The fair market value of the asset transferred to the taxpayer equals the present 
value of the loan‟s principal payment at maturity, which the taxpayer agrees to pay. 
 176. Id.  The tax neutral entity agrees to make all interest payments on the loan, and the 
parties anticipate that the purchased assets will constitute sufficient collateral to repay the 
loan. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Country Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410 at *16 (noting the loss was artificial 
and that the taxpayer lacked a nontax business purpose for entering into the transaction). 
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transaction failed the objective prong because it lacked profit potential and 
resulted in negative cash flow.
179
  Additionally, the transaction failed the 
subjective prong because the court found that there was substantial 
evidence that the decision to enter into the transaction was motivated solely 
by tax avoidance.
180
 
The IRS did not assert penalties in the Country Pine case.
181
  
However, the CARDS tax shelter relies on an inflated basis to achieve a 
deductible loss, which makes the gross valuation misstatement penalty 
applicable to the transaction.  Additionally, the Tax Court‟s finding that the 
transaction was motivated solely by tax avoidance should satisfy the 
definition of tax shelter for purposes of the substantial understatement 
penalty.  Finally, as was the case with the Son-of-BOSS tax shelter, the 
CARDS tax shelter at issue in Country Pine is both a listed transaction
182
 
and is likely a loss transaction,
183
 which would have made the reportable 
transaction understatement penalty applicable in this case. 
This analysis indicates that, even though tax shelters have evolved 
over time, the tax shelter penalties in the current accuracy-related regime 
should continue to apply in economic substance doctrine cases.  The 
creation of a new tax shelter penalty does not appear to fill any gaps in the 
current regime. 
4. The Complexity that Results from Adding a Fourth Tax Shelter 
Penalty 
Given that the current accuracy-related penalty regime is more than 
adequate to address tax shelters, the new economic substance penalty does 
not appear to add anything useful to this regime.  Rather, the new penalty 
exacerbates the problems with the current regime, which is arguably over-
complicated already. 
While noble, Congress‟s repeated attempts to stiffen penalties on tax 
shelters have been piecemeal.
184
  Newer penalties have been enacted 
 
 179. Id. at *15. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at *8. 
 182. I.R.S. Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html . 
 183. The case involved a partnership, Country Pine Finance LLC, that had individual 
members.  The partnership claimed a $7,917,000 short-term capital loss and a $4,045,000 
ordinary loss, which it disclosed under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T (2007).  Country 
Pine Fin., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 410, at *8.   The reportable transaction rules have a $2 million 
threshold for losses claimed by partnerships that do not have all corporate partners.  
Additionally, there is an even lower threshold ($50,000) for individual losses based on 
certain foreign currency transactions.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5)(C), (E) (as amended in 
2010). 
 184. See, e.g., NY Bar Submits Comments, supra note 98 (proposing modifications to 
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without removing or amending old penalties, with no explanation as to 
whether the newer penalties are intended to replace the older penalties, or 
whether they are meant to supplement the older regime by filling 
specifically identified gaps.
185
  The result is that when dealing with an 
abusive tax shelter, a complicated matrix of potential penalties exists, each 
with different taxpayer defenses. 
When a taxpayer is contemplating whether to enter into a particular 
transaction, or contemplating whether to take a certain tax position with 
respect to a completed transaction, the taxpayer may seek advice from an 
advisor or attempt to determine the potential tax consequences on its own.  
Either way, if the tax position is questionable, an important consideration 
likely will be the consequences of the taxpayer‟s position not being 
sustained on the merits, including what types of penalties might apply.  A 
further consideration, particularly for a more sophisticated taxpayer, might 
be what can be done to avoid the application of a penalty in the event the 
taxpayer‟s position is not sustained on the merits. 
For a taxpayer or tax advisor attempting to undertake such an analysis, 
a number of accuracy-related penalties must be considered.
186
  The 
requirements for avoiding accuracy-related penalties will depend on how 
the transaction is characterized.  For example, if the taxpayer‟s position 
results in a substantial understatement or a gross valuation misstatement, 
the taxpayer may be able to avail itself of the reasonable cause and good 
faith defense provided by I.R.C. § 6664(c).  Even if there is not substantial 
legal authority that supports the taxpayer‟s position, the taxpayer may still 
be able to avoid the penalty through, for example, reasonable and good 
faith reliance on the advice of a tax advisor.
187
 
However, if the transaction is deemed a “tax shelter,” the taxpayer 
may be subject to the more stringent reasonable cause and good faith 
requirements for tax shelters, which require, at a minimum, both substantial 
authority and a reasonable belief that the taxpayer‟s position was more 
likely than not correct.
188
  In this case, the taxpayer‟s good faith reliance on 
 
the Section 6662 penalty in America‟s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009). 
 185. See supra Part II.A. 
 186. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1 (stating that this consideration is in addition to any non-
accuracy-related penalties that may apply). 
 187. The most important factor in determining whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable 
cause and good faith for purposes of I.R.C. §6664(c) is the extent of the taxpayer‟s efforts to 
assess her proper tax liability.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (2003).  Circumstances that may 
indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law 
that is reasonable in light of the taxpayer‟s experience, knowledge, and education, or 
reliance on the advice of a professional if such reliance was reasonable under the 
circumstances and the taxpayer acted in good faith.  Id. 
 188. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f) (2003) (the heightened reasonable cause and good faith 
requirement only applies to corporate taxpayers). 
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the advice of a tax advisor will not be sufficient to avoid the penalty if there 
is not legal authority amounting to “substantial authority” that supports the 
taxpayer‟s position.
189
  Additionally, even if there is substantial authority to 
support the taxpayer‟s position, the taxpayer‟s reliance on an advisor will 
not be sufficient unless the advisor has unambiguously concluded there is a 
greater than 50 percent likelihood that the taxpayer‟s position would be 
upheld if challenged.
190
 
A taxpayer must further consider whether its transaction would 
constitute a reportable transaction.  If so, it will not be able to avail itself of 
the heightened reasonable cause and good faith defense unless it discloses 
its transaction.
191
  Finally, if the transaction could be found to violate the 
economic substance doctrine, then no reasonable cause or other defenses 
will be available if the new economic substance penalty applies.
192
 
A taxpayer contemplating a transaction that could potentially fall into 
several of these categories must contemplate whether it should attempt to 
satisfy the most stringent reasonable cause requirements, or whether it 
should assume that it will be subject to strict liability if penalized.  In that 
case, the taxpayer might determine it is not worth the expense to satisfy the 
reasonable cause requirements.  In addition to trying to determine which, if 
any, defenses the taxpayer should attempt to satisfy, the rate of the penalty 
will vary depending on which penalty applies. 
The various defenses to accuracy-related penalties, as applicable after 
the recent codification of the economic substance doctrine, are illustrated in 
Appendix A.  As can be seen from the table in Appendix A, the accuracy-
related penalty regime presents a complicated matrix of taxpayer defenses 
for tax shelter transactions. 
B. The Negative Implications of Complexity 
The overlap between the new economic substance penalty and the 
current tax shelter penalties creates unnecessary complexity in the current 
penalty regime. Over-complicating the accuracy-related penalty regime 
defeats the very purpose for which these penalties were enacted.  
Taxpayers cannot be encouraged to comply with the tax laws if they do not 
understand the penalties that were designed to encourage good behavior.  
Similarly, the IRS must fully comprehend the intricacies of the penalty 
regime and have the resources to effectively enforce it. 
 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 190. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(B)(2) (2003). 
 191. See supra note 50. 
 192. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
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1. The Stated Purpose Behind the Penalty Regime 
The IRS‟s official policy on tax penalties is that they exist primarily to 
“encourage voluntary compliance.”
193
  Other than its brief policy 
statements in the Internal Revenue Manual, which are updated from time to 
time, the IRS‟s last official elucidation on penalty policy was offered in 
1989, when an IRS task force published the results of a comprehensive 
study on civil tax penalties.
194
  The report concluded that tax penalties 
promote voluntary compliance by helping taxpayers understand “right” 
versus “wrong” conduct, by deterring noncompliance, and by establishing 
the fairness of the tax system.
195
 
The task force highlighted the importance of “comprehensibility” in 
tax penalties, observing that the IRS‟s goal of voluntary compliance 
required that penalties be both “understandable and understood” by 
taxpayers.
196
  In order to properly deter taxpayers, the task force concluded 
that they must understand the probable consequences of their departure 
from the requirements of the tax laws, and further understand the logic 
upon which the penalty being imposed is based.
197
 
In addition to promoting the deterrence objectives of voluntary 
compliance, the task force noted the effect that comprehensibility has on 
the administration of penalties.  Specifically, the task force observed that: 
As penalties become more numerous and more complicated, it 
becomes more difficult for an employee of the IRS to be aware of 
all penalties and to make quality judgments as to when they 
should be asserted or abated. Thus, complexity works against 
both a taxpayer‟s ability to understand the consequences of 
noncompliance and the Service‟s ability to administer the system 
effectively and fairly.
198
 
The penalty policies announced by the IRS task force, including the 
importance of comprehensibility, were also articulated by Congress when it 
overhauled the former penalty regime in 1989 in favor of a system that was 
 
 193. IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, I.R.M. § 20.1.1.2 (Feb. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-001r.html#d0e406; IRS Policy Statement 20-1, 
I.R.M. § 1.2.20.1.1 (June 29, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part1/irm_01-002-
020.html. 
 194. Tax Analysts, IRS Executive Task Force Releases Penalty Reform Proposals, 89 
TNT 45-36 (Feb. 27, 1989) (LEXIS) [hereinafter Tax Analysts II] (citing Executive Task 
Force for the Commissioner‟s Penalty Study, Report on Civil Tax Penalties) (the stated goal 
of the Task Force‟s report was to set out the underlying reasons for tax penalties, a method 
of evaluating them, goals for penalty administration, an evaluation of existing penalties, and 
recommendations for change). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 43. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 44. 
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more closely tailored to the goal of promoting voluntary compliance.
199
  
Commentators and practitioners have also echoed the importance of 
comprehensibility in promoting voluntary compliance in more recent years.  
For example, in a statement of policy released by the American Bar 
Association Section of Taxation in 2009, the authors concluded that 
promoting voluntary compliance “requires that the penalties be relatively 
simple and logical.”
200
 
The current tax shelter penalty regime has trended away from the 
IRS‟s and Congress‟s stated policy of enacting penalties that are simple and 
easy to understand and to administer.  The economic substance penalty 
further frustrates this stated policy because it adds yet another penalty to 
the list of accuracy-related penalties aimed at tax shelters, and contains 
standards (for example, strict liability) that are distinct from the standards 
imposed by the other tax shelter penalties.  The substantial overlap that 
exists between the application of other tax shelter penalties and the new 
economic substance penalty
201
 will make it hard for taxpayers to determine 
which penalty or penalties they must consider when contemplating the 
consequences of their conduct.  This will inevitably require a certain 
amount of guesswork, particularly since neither the reportable transaction 
understatement penalty nor the new economic substance penalty has been 
tested in economic substance doctrine cases. 
Additionally, the differing standards among the penalties require the 
taxpayer to consider a variety of requirements for a potential reasonable 
cause defense, which further frustrates the goal of promoting voluntary 
compliance.
202
  For example, a taxpayer undertaking a transaction that 
might constitute a tax shelter and violate the economic substance doctrine 
will not know whether it is best served by incurring the additional time and 
expense to satisfy the heightened reasonable cause and good faith 
 
 199. See REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98 (citing the Improved Penalty 
Administration and Compliance Tax Act, enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106).  For example, Sen. J.J. 
Pickle, Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight, observed that penalties should be 
“readily known and easily understood.”  Id. at 3 (citing Letter from Sen. J.J. Pickle, 
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight, to Sen. Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House 
Ways and Means Committee (June 15, 1989) (available at 1989 TNT 128-4) (1989) 
(LEXIS)). 
 200. Tax Analysts, ABA Tax Section Recommends Overhaul of Tax Penalty Regime, 
2009 TNT 75-25 (Apr. 22, 2009) (LEXIS) [hereinafter Tax Analysts III] (citing Stuart M. 
Lewis, Statement of Policy Favoring Reform of Federal Civil Tax Penalties, 2009 TNT 75-
25, 2, (2009)).  See also REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98 (“Penalties should 
articulate standards of behavior that are clear and understandable so that taxpayers and 
practitioners know the extent of their obligations . . . .”). 
 201. See supra Parts IV.A.1 and IV.A.2. 
 202. See supra Part IV.A.4. 
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requirement,
203
 or whether it will likely be subject to strict liability if its 
position is not upheld.  In effect, the new economic substance penalty has 
injected additional uncertainty as to what type of behavior Congress 
intends to encourage.  Does Congress want to encourage taxpayers to seek 
the advice of tax professionals, thus promoting tax positions that are 
arrived at after a reasoned, legal analysis of relevant tax authority?  Or is 
Congress‟s primary aim to more effectively deter taxpayers from 
participating in tax shelters by depriving them of any “out,” including 
reliance on a tax opinion?
204
  The answer is unclear.  Either way, Congress 
cannot effectively shape taxpayer behavior through penalties if taxpayers 
do not know the standards that will apply to their conduct. 
2. Thoughtful Penalty Legislation 
The guiding principles highlighted in the task force report are no less 
true today than they were twenty years ago when the IRS announced its 
penalty philosophy.  The importance of comprehensibility is particularly 
relevant in today‟s tax penalty regime, as penalties have become more 
numerous and complex over time.
205
 
Since the issuance of the IRS task force report in 1989, there has been 
a growing emphasis on the use of penalties to combat abusive tax shelters.  
Differentiating penalties imposed on taxpayers who participate in tax 
shelters from other penalties aimed at less egregious conduct necessitates 
some degree of additional complexity in the penalty regime.  However, to 
continue to promote voluntary compliance, the benefits obtained through 
increasing the complexity of the penalty regime should be carefully 
weighed against the detriment it may cause to the overall policy goals of 
the penalty regime. 
To this end, additional penalties should only be enacted after thorough 
evaluation of how the current penalty regime has addressed the perceived 
problem that the new penalty proposes to solve.  Congress should avoid 
“piling on penalties”
206
 by seeking first to identify and correct gaps in the 
 
 203. This expense may arise, for example, through the engagement of a professional tax 
advisor to render a tax opinion that satisfies the “more likely than not” standard required for 
reasonable cause. 
 204. It does not appear that Congress has answered this question.  If the new economic 
substance doctrine penalty represents a new congressional attitude towards penalties, then 
presumably the strict liability standard is a replacement of the older reasonable cause 
standard. 
 205. See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING THE PENALTY REGIME 1 (2008) (explaining that between 1954 
and 2008, the number of civil tax penalties increased from approximately 14 to more than 
130). 
 206. An earlier proposal for the new strict liability economic substance penalty was 
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current penalty regime before adding new penalties to the regime.  
Additionally, the enactment of new penalties, or amendments to current 
penalties, should not be undertaken in a vacuum.  Even if a new penalty is 
deemed necessary because the current regime is entirely inadequate to 
address a particular problem, Congress should consider whether older 
penalties should be repealed, or whether it needs to clarify the interaction 
between the new penalty and the current penalties.
207
 
In contrast to this approach, it appears the new economic substance 
penalty was enacted without careful consideration of the effectiveness of 
the current accuracy-related penalty regime in the context of tax shelters.  
For example, it is almost inconceivable that Congress could have 
determined that the new reportable transaction understatement penalty, 
enacted just six years ago in 2004, was insufficient in economic substance 
doctrine cases, when the case law has not yet caught up with the effective 
date of this penalty.
208
  Additionally, Congress would have better served the 
goal of comprehensibility in the tax penalty regime by clarifying 
application of the current penalties to economic substance doctrine cases, 
such as clarifying the circuit split on the application of the gross valuation 
misstatement penalty,
209
 rather than enacting a new penalty.  If Congress 
did have specific justifications for a new penalty that outweigh the 
additional complexity created by the penalty, it has not effectively 
articulated these so that taxpayers, advisors, and the IRS can understand 
how and when the new penalty should be applied vis-à-vis the other tax 
shelter penalties. 
This part has demonstrated that creating a new economic substance 
penalty is unnecessary because the current accuracy-related penalty regime 
is sufficient to address transactions that violate the economic substance 
doctrine.  This part has further demonstrated that the new economic 
substance penalty will frustrate the goal of promoting voluntary compliance 
through comprehensibility because the new penalty adds significant and 
undue complexity to the current regime. 
Given the substantial overlap between transactions that violate the 
economic substance doctrine and transactions covered by the other tax 
 
appropriately described by then-IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb as “the latest example of 
Congress piling on penalties . . . .”  Tax Analysts I, supra note 108.  The American Bar 
Association Tax Section‟s statement on penalty policy also pointed out that stacking new 
penalties on top of existing penalties results in increased complexity and “do[es] little to 
enhance the perception of the tax system as reasonable.”  Tax Analysts III, supra note 200, 
at 4. 
 207. Although accuracy-related penalties generally cannot be stacked, the IRS is always 
free to assert a number of penalties in the alternative in the case of single transaction.  See 
supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
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shelter penalties, the economic substance penalty does not appear to add 
anything “new” to the current regime, other than strict liability.  But in 
addition to failing to articulate the reasons for enacting a new tax shelter 
penalty in light of the current penalty regime, Congress has also failed to 
articulate the reasons for imposing strict liability on transactions that 
violate the economic substance doctrine when it has elected not to do so for 
past tax shelter penalties. 
V. IS THERE A PLACE FOR STRICT LIABILITY IN THE CURRENT PENALTY 
REGIME? 
This part considers whether there is any justification for carving out 
transactions that violate economic substance as especially deserving of 
strict liability as compared to reportable transactions or tax shelter 
transactions where the economic substance doctrine has not been raised.  
This part will not attempt to make any normative conclusions about 
whether strict liability is fair or an effective deterrent in the context of tax 
penalties.  Rather, I will argue that the strict liability aspect of the penalty 
cannot be justified in the context of the current penalty regime, which does 
not provide for strict liability, because there is nothing special about the 
economic substance doctrine as compared to other methods of policing tax 
shelters.  While I have argued in Part IV that a new penalty is unnecessary 
altogether, irrespective of the standard imposed by that penalty, Part V will 
focus specifically on the strict liability standard and conclude that it cannot 
be reconciled with the standards imposed by the other tax shelter penalties. 
A. There’s Nothing Special About the Economic Substance Doctrine 
It is clear that the recent legislation codifying the economic substance 
doctrine and adding a new economic substance penalty was intended by 
Congress to address the tax shelter epidemic.
210
  This was also true when 
Congress enacted the valuation misstatement penalty, the substantial 
understatement penalty (with the carve out for tax shelters), and the 
reportable transaction understatement penalty.
211
  The justifications 
advanced for the new economic substance penalty have largely centered 
 
 210. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S2624-01 (2009) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“[The 
economic substance doctrine] has become a powerful analytical tool used by courts to 
invalidate abusive tax shelters . . . . Since no tax shelter legislation would be complete 
without addressing this issue . . . this comprehensive bill proposes once more to include the 
economic substance doctrine in the tax code.”); 151 CONG. REC. S9472-01 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Bond) (“[This] bill would strengthen legal prohibitions against abusive 
tax shelters by codifying in federal tax statutes for the first time what is known as the 
economic substance doctrine.”). 
 211. See supra Part II.A. 
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around the goal of deterring participation in tax shelters and giving the IRS 
an extra advantage in factually complex tax shelter transactions.
212
  These 
justifications are appropriate concerns in the context of abusive tax shelters, 
but they don‟t address what it is about violations of the economic substance 
doctrine, apart from tax shelters in general, that merits a strict liability 
penalty.  To justify singling out transactions that violate the economic 
substance doctrine for special treatment, Congress should have articulated 
why such transactions stand apart from other tax shelters. 
1. “Tax Shelters” Versus the Economic Substance Doctrine 
It is difficult to determine if violations of the economic substance 
doctrine are a subset of tax shelters, if tax shelters are a subset of violations 
of the economic substance, or if the two can be considered proxies for one 
another.  There is no legislative or regulatory definition of a “tax shelter” 
that is intended as a substantive disallowance provision.  In other words, 
tax shelters have been attacked from many angles, but there is no Internal 
Revenue Code provision that prohibits the use of “tax shelters” per se.  
This is unsurprising given the difficulty, if not impossibility, of finding a 
universal definition for the term.
213
 
Although there may not be a generally accepted definition of what 
constitutes a tax shelter,
214
 commentators have agreed on some of the 
defining characteristics of abusive tax shelters.  Tax shelters have been 
described broadly as tax strategies that produce unintended benefits while 
complying with the literal terms of the Internal Revenue Code.
215
  Put more 
simply, what separates abusive tax shelters from other transactions is 
whether or not Congress intended to provide the result claimed by the 
taxpayer.
216
  Tax shelters have also been described as transactions that 
produce a tax deduction or tax loss without an accompanying economic 
 
 212. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 213. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 71, at 399. 
 214. See id.; Calvin H. Johnson, What’s a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES 879 (1995) 
(arguing that the best definition of “tax shelter” involves investments that are more valuable 
post-tax than pre-tax); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The 
Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 328 
(2002) (noting the absence of a universal definition and proposing that “tax shelter” be 
defined in terms of violation of congressional intent). 
 215. Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Disclosure: Towards Tax Shelter Detection, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2009). 
 216. Lederman, supra note 71, at 396-97.  See also Schler, supra note 214, at 330 (“[I]t 
seems impossible to define a tax shelter except in terms of congressional or regulatory 
intent.”).  Schler argues that a tax shelter should be defined as a transaction that complies 
with the literal terms of the Internal Revenue Code, reaches a result unintended by 
Congress, and is accompanied by a tax avoidance motive.  Id. at 331. 
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loss.
217
  In contrast, there are other types of abusive transactions that 
generally would not be considered to constitute tax shelters, such as 
fraudulent transactions or transactions that constitute tax evasion.
218
 
While the term “tax shelter” has been defined in the context of the 
penalty regime for purposes of the substantial understatement penalty,
219
 
that definition generally has been limited to its specific context.  A 
definition that is based upon the taxpayer having a tax avoidance motive, 
such as that found in I.R.C. § 6662(d), is overly broad since it encompasses 
transactions that do not necessarily fall within the commonly accepted 
notion of tax shelters.
220
  For example, nearly everyone would agree that 
the making of a check-the-box election under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) 
would not constitute a tax shelter, even if the taxpayer‟s sole motivation for 
making the election was to avoid tax.
221
 
Defining tax shelters by reference to the two prongs of the economic 
substance doctrine, as transactions that lack economic substance or a 
business purpose, is also overly broad.  For example, one commentator has 
suggested that a transaction in which a taxpayer intentionally sells an asset 
to trigger gain that is offset by an expiring net operating loss, followed by 
an immediate repurchase of the asset with a stepped-up basis, would lack 
objective economic substance and a business purpose, but would not be 
considered to be a tax shelter.
222
  It has also been suggested that such a 
definition of tax shelter is too narrow, as this would exclude transactions 
that meet the bare minimum amount of objective substance or business 
purpose to satisfy the economic substance doctrine but would otherwise be 
considered to be tax shelters.
223
 
Although tax shelters continue to be generally undefined in 
legislation, Congress has specifically defined what constitutes a violation 
of the economic substance doctrine.
224
  Under new I.R.C. § 7701(o), a 
transaction will only be treated as having economic substance if it changes 
 
 217. David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be 
Applied?, 60 TAX L. REV. 29, 31 (2006).  See also Peter Canellos, Tax Practitioner’s 
Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions 
and Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 52-53 (2001) (comparing “real transactions” with 
“tax shelters”). 
 218. Lederman, supra note 71, at 396 n.19.  While a tax shelter generally complies with 
the literal terms of the tax code, a fraudulent or illegal transaction does not.  Schler, supra 
note 214, at 330. 
 219. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 220. See, e.g., Schler, supra note 214, at 329 (noting that issuance of debt rather than 
equity would not constitute a tax shelter even if the sole motive was to obtain the interest 
deduction). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Hariton, supra note 217, at 35-36. 
 223. Schler, supra note 214, at 329-30. 
 224. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
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the taxpayer‟s economic position in a meaningful, non-tax way, and if the 
taxpayer has a substantial non-tax purpose for entering into the 
transaction.
225
 
The new economic substance doctrine legislation is, however, only a 
clarification of the existing judicial doctrine.
226
  It is intended to provide “a 
uniform definition of economic substance,” but is not intended to alter the 
flexibility of courts in determining when the doctrine is relevant to a 
particular transaction.
227
  More importantly, the new legislation (and the 
legislative history thereof) does not claim to provide a uniform definition of 
“tax shelter.”  As discussed above, the objective and subjective prongs of 
the economic substance doctrine are both too broad and too narrow to fully 
encompass all abusive tax shelters. 
But defining tax shelters was not the intent of codification of the 
economic substance doctrine.  The economic substance doctrine is merely a 
judicial tool used to disallow tax benefits not intended by Internal Revenue 
Code when the substantive provisions of the Code fail to provide a basis for 
disallowance.
228
  The doctrine gives courts one mechanism to distinguish 
between legitimate transactions and abusive tax shelters.  However, courts 
may confront other tax shelters where the economic substance doctrine is 
not necessary to disallow the claimed benefits.  This can be seen, for 
example, in tax shelter cases where courts have held against the taxpayer 
on alternative grounds that included both the economic substance doctrine 
and a substantive provision of the Code.
229
 
The relationship between the economic substance doctrine and tax 
shelters makes it difficult to understand why Congress singled out the new 
economic substance penalty for a strict liability penalty.  To isolate 
violations of economic substance as deserving of strict liability seems to 
suggest that, out of the realm of all tax shelters, these are the “worst” kinds 
of transactions.  Yet Congress does not appear to be isolating a subset of 
tax shelters by codifying the doctrine.  Tax shelters are clearly the problem, 
and the economic substance doctrine is simply one mechanism for 
substantively attacking the problem. 
 
 225. See supra note 74. 
 226. I.R.C. § 7701(o) is appropriately entitled “Clarification of Economic Substance 
Doctrine.” 
 227. See JCX-18-10, supra note 70, at 152; JCX-11-10, supra note 70, at 189; JCX-47-
09, supra note 70, at 90; see also H.R. 4872, § 1409(a), new I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“. . . 
the provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any other 
rule of law . . . .”), and supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 228. See, e.g., Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1354 (“[T]he economic substance doctrine is merely a 
judicial tool for effectuating the underlying Congressional purpose that, despite literal 
compliance with the statute, tax benefits not be afforded based on transactions lacking in 
economic substance.”). 
 229. See supra note 96. 
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Another possibility is that applying strict liability to violations of the 
economic substance doctrine is Congress‟s way of saying that all tax 
shelters are now subject to strict liability.  But if that is the case, Congress 
should have explicitly said so.  Codification of the economic substance 
doctrine is a poor (although perhaps convenient) platform for legislating a 
sweeping change to how Congress will now penalize tax shelters.  Further, 
the fact that the reasonable cause defense was not removed from the other 
tax shelter penalties does not align with this theory. 
2. Making Sense of the Current Tax Shelter Penalty Standards 
Despite the difficulty of drafting substantive rules to prohibit tax 
shelters, the tax shelter problem has been addressed with some degree of 
success through disclosure rules and penalty provisions specifically 
targeted at tax shelters.
230
  Although these tax shelter penalties have 
evolved over time, the changes to the accuracy-related penalty regime in 
the past decade can be understood when viewed in the context of 
Congress‟s overall goal of cracking down on tax shelters. 
For example, the 2004 Jobs Act eliminated the substantial authority 
and reasonable belief excuse for all taxpayers participating in tax 
shelters.
231
  This makes sense because defenses for substantial 
understatements with respect to tax shelters should be more limited than the 
defenses for other substantial understatements since tax shelters are the 
transactions Congress has a special interest in deterring and punishing.
232
  
It‟s true that the definition of “tax shelter” in I.R.C. § 6662(d) casts a wider 
net than what most would consider to be characteristic of true tax 
shelters.
233
  However, the very use of the term “tax shelter” in the penalty 
legislation at least gives some indication of what sets the penalty apart from 
other substantial understatements.  While the scope of the carve out for tax 
shelters in I.R.C. § 6662(d) is imperfect, it at least sends a clear message 
that Congress intended for taxpayer defenses to be limited when they 
 
 230. See supra Part IV.A.1; Canellos, supra note 217, at 52 (considering the tax bar‟s 
conclusion that disclosure rules and penalty provisions largely solve the problem of tax 
shelters). 
 231. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 232. The difference in standards between the gross valuation misstatement penalty and 
the substantial understatement penalty for tax shelters can be similarly justified.  Although 
the valuation misstatement penalty was enacted in response to the tax shelter epidemic, it 
was drafted broadly to address all valuation misstatements meeting a certain threshold, and 
Congress did not attempt to limit it to “tax shelters.”  See supra notes 19-21 and 
accompanying text.  However, the more than twenty year gap in time between the enactment 
of the original valuation misstatement and the 2004 Jobs Act probably has more to do with 
the difference in standards between these penalties. 
 233. See supra notes 220 and 221 and accompanying text. 
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participate in tax shelters. 
The addition of the reportable transaction understatement penalty is 
also comprehensible in the overall context of the accuracy-related penalty 
regime.  At the time the penalty was enacted in 2004, a tax shelter penalty 
for substantial understatements was already in place with a heightened 
reasonable cause defense.  The newer reportable transaction understatement 
penalty is even more severe than the substantial understatement penalty for 
tax shelters because it provides a more restrictive reasonable cause defense 
(requiring disclosure), along with a higher rate for undisclosed transactions, 
and the use of the understatement (rather than the underpayment) as the 
penalty base.
234
  Although congressional justifications for the new penalty 
were generic and vague,
235
 some sense can be made of the fact that the 
reportable and listed transactions were being singled out and treated 
differently. 
First, the reportable transaction understatement penalty addresses a 
specific subset of tax shelters.  The penalty applies to all listed transactions 
and any reportable transaction for which the taxpayer has a significant 
purpose of tax avoidance.
236
  Reportable transactions are specific types of 
transactions that have been identified by Treasury regulations as having the 
potential for tax avoidance or evasion, and include listed transactions, 
confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection, loss 
transactions, and transactions of interest.
237
  For both listed transactions and 
transactions of interest, the transaction has been specifically identified by 
the IRS through a notice or other publication.
238
  The characteristics of 
confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection, and loss 
transactions are also specifically identified by the regulations.
239
  While it 
may be difficult to determine whether a transaction falls under the vague 
definition of “tax shelter” for purposes of the substantial understatement 
penalty, it is comparatively easy, for example, to determine whether a 
transaction constitutes a listed transaction. 
Congress was not attempting to define all tax shelters through I.R.C. § 
6662A, but it singled out a group of common tax shelter transactions for 
special treatment.  Because listed and reportable transactions are a 
specifically identified subset of tax shelters, a separate penalty standard for 
these transactions is justifiable. 
 
 234. See I.R.C. §§ 6662A(a)-(d) (West 2010); H.R. 108-393, 108th Cong. Title III.A.5 
(2003).  There is no reasonable cause exception if the transaction is undisclosed.  
 235. H.R. 108-393, 108th Cong. Title III.A.5 (2003).  
 236. I.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2) (West 2010). 
 237. See I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d) (West 2010), 6707A(c)(1) (West 2010); Treas. Reg. § 
1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2010); and text accompanying note 44.  
 238. See I.R.C. §§ 6662A(d) (West 2010), 6707A(c)(1) (West 2010); Treas. Reg. § 
1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2010); and text accompanying note 44.  
 239. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)-(5) (as amended in 2010). 
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Second, the fact that the standard for reportable and listed transactions 
is stricter than the standard imposed by other tax shelter penalties is also 
justifiable (although this was also not articulated by Congress).  Because 
these transactions have been specifically identified and described in 
Treasury regulations, taxpayers are on notice as to whether or not a 
particular transaction is considered to be a tax shelter and will be penalized 
as such.
240
  Given that Congress has specified which types of transactions 
need to be reported by taxpayers, it is not illogical to require disclosure to 
maintain a reasonable cause defense, even though other tax shelter 
penalties can be avoided without such disclosure. 
3. No Justification for the New Strict Liability Penalty 
In contrast to reportable and listed transactions, the economic 
substance doctrine legislation does not identify a narrowly defined subset 
of tax shelter transactions.  It also does not identify a new type of behavior 
not anticipated by other tax shelter penalties.  The doctrine merely provides 
a legal basis to disallow tax shelter benefits where other substantive 
provisions of the tax law fall short. Thus, there is no reason to carve out 
violations of the economic substance doctrine as a unique group of tax 
shelter transactions deserving of a stricter penalty as compared to other tax 
shelter penalties. 
We don‟t have an explanation as to why, after the enactment of the 
new penalty, taxpayers in violation of economic substance doctrine are 
subject to strict liability, while taxpayers whose transactions constitute a 
“tax shelter” for purposes of the substantial understatement rules can rely 
on a reasonable cause defense.  What we do know is that the legislative 
history of both the substantial understatement and economic substance 
doctrine penalties indicates that Congress wanted to crack down on tax 
shelters.
241
  Given that violations of the economic substance doctrine do not 
represent a unique subset of tax shelters, and given that there does not 
appear to be anything more onerous about violating the economic 
substance doctrine as compared to participating in a tax shelter as defined 
under I.R.C. § 6662(d), there is no reason for taxpayer defenses to the 
economic substance penalty to be more limited than the defenses for the 
substantial understatement penalty for tax shelters. 
If Congress felt that the “tax shelter” definition under I.R.C. § 6662(d) 
was too broad to be treated on par with violations of the economic 
substance doctrine, perhaps out of concern that the “tax shelter” definition 
 
 240. The reportable transaction understatement penalty is only effective for tax years 
ending after the date of its enactment.  See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 241. See supra text accompanying note 35; supra Part II.B.2.a. 
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may cover some non-tax shelter types of transactions,
242
 then it is unclear 
why the substantial understatement penalty with respect to tax shelters has 
a heightened reasonable cause defense at all.  If Congress had some other 
justification for treating violations of the economic substance doctrine more 
harshly than tax shelters under I.R.C. § 6662(d), it should have articulated 
this reasoning.  Without any rationalization for the differences in these 
taxpayer defenses, the accuracy-related penalty regime contains 
inconsistent standards, leading to disparate treatment of similarly situated 
taxpayers. 
In the case of reportable and listed transactions, the disparity in 
standards is even harder to justify.  Although Congress did adopt a 
provision that provides for strict liability for reportable and listed 
transactions that also violate the economic substance doctrine, it chose not 
to make strict liability the standard for all reportable and listed transactions 
subject to the reportable transaction understatement.
243
  The result is simply 
that when a transaction is subject to both penalties, the standards in the 
economic substance penalty trump the reasonable cause defense for 
reportable transactions.  In a tax shelter case where a court disallows tax 
benefits under a substantive provision of the Code and opts not to apply the 
economic substance doctrine, it appears the reasonable cause defense 
would still be available to the taxpayer if the reportable transaction 
understatement penalty is applied. 
The fact that taxpayers are on notice as to what constitutes a 
reportable or listed transaction justifies the more limited taxpayer defenses 
for the reportable transaction understatement.  In contrast, violations of the 
economic substance doctrine arise in areas of the law that are unclear, when 
neither statute nor case law is directly on point.  Strict liability is not 
appropriate in the context of the economic substance doctrine given that 
Congress has explicitly rejected strict liability for listed and reportable 
transactions.
244
 
This discrepancy between the taxpayer defenses to reportable 
transaction understatements and the economic substance penalty could lead 
to absurd results.  For example, a taxpayer could engage in a listed 
transaction, but if the benefits are disallowed by the IRS or a court under a 
substantive provision of the Code rather than the economic substance 
doctrine, the taxpayer might be able to avoid all penalties if she can meet 
the heightened reasonable cause and good faith requirements for the 
reportable transaction understatement.
245
  On the other hand, a taxpayer that 
 
 242. Schler, supra note 214, at 329.  
 243. H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. § 1409(c)(2) (2010); I.R.C. § 6664(d) (West 2010). 
 244. H.R. 108-393, 108th Cong. Title III.A.5 (2003).  
 245. It might be difficult, however, for a taxpayer to demonstrate that she had a 
reasonable belief that her position was more likely than not correct when the transaction had 
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engages in a tax shelter that has not yet been identified by the IRS as a 
listed transaction would not be able to rely on a reasonable cause defense if 
her tax benefits were disallowed under the economic substance doctrine.  In 
some respects, the first taxpayer engaged in more egregious conduct than 
the second taxpayer, because the first taxpayer engaged in a transaction that 
the IRS had specifically identified in advance as a tax shelter.  In contrast, 
the second taxpayer might have engaged in a novel transaction that had not 
yet been addressed by the courts or the IRS, and taken a good faith position 
that her claimed benefits were allowable. 
After the enactment of the new economic substance penalty, whether 
taxpayers are on notice as to which particular transactions are abusive is no 
longer relevant to how the taxpayer will be penalized.  The sole factor that 
determines whether or not a taxpayer can assert a reasonable cause and 
good faith defense is if the economic substance doctrine was the means by 
which a court or the IRS chose to disallow the claimed tax benefits.  
Taxpayers that partake in tax shelters that violate a provision of the Code 
will be better off than taxpayers that undertake novel transactions that 
comply with the letter of the Code but are later found to lack economic 
substance and a business purpose.  All of these tax shelter participants 
should be subject to heightened penalty standards, but the disparities in 
standards in the new accuracy-related penalty regime do not make sense. 
B. Disparities Lead to Disparate Treatment 
The discrepancy in standards brought about by the new strict liability 
penalty frustrates the IRS‟s and Congress‟s overall goal of promoting 
voluntary taxpayer compliance, just as adding a fourth tax shelter penalty 
frustrates that goal by making the tax shelter penalty regime overly 
complex.
246
 
The IRS‟s 1989 task force report on civil tax penalties concluded that, 
in addition to the importance of comprehensibility, an important way to 
promote voluntary compliance through tax penalties is to ensure that those 
penalties reflect the fairness of the tax system.
247
  Taxpayers who feel that 
tax penalties are fair are more likely to be motivated to comply with the tax 
law.  The task force further established that an essential aspect of 
establishing the fairness of the system is for tax penalties to be consistent, 
which includes consistency with the taxpayer‟s own prior experience and 
 
been previously listed by the IRS.  See I.R.C. § 6664(d) (West 2010).  There is no 
reasonable cause exception if the transaction is undisclosed. 
 246. See supra Part IV.B. 
 247. See IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, § 20.1.1.2.2, at 7; Tax Analysts II, 
supra note 194, at 19 (describing the philosophy of penalties), and accompanying text. 
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consistency between similarly situated taxpayers.
248
  The IRS has also 
reiterated this goal more recently in its Penalty Handbook, stating that 
taxpayers‟ “overall confidence in the tax system is jeopardized” when 
penalties do not apply consistently in similar situations.
249
 
The IRS task force went a step further and identified broad principles 
that should be followed in enacting penalty legislation to ensure that the 
goals of fairness and consistency are met.  One of these core principles 
includes ensuring that the standards in penalties are logically tied to the 
level of culpability of the conduct being penalized.  The Task Force stated: 
Penalty programs should consistently identify and assert penalties 
against those taxpayers who are the most culpable either because 
of the extent of a particular violation or the consistent pattern of 
violations over time.  Those who deviate farthest from a standard 
of behavior should be the ones who receive the greatest penalty 
(as well as having the greatest likelihood of getting caught).  This 
may have implications for the design of penalties -- leading to a 
preference for graduated penalties -- and may have implications 
for the types of taxpayer information that should be available to 
IRS.
250
 
The task force‟s emphasis on consistency was also echoed by 
Congress when it overhauled the former penalty regime in 1989 in favor of 
a system that was more closely tailored to the goal of promoting voluntary 
compliance.
251
  The importance of consistency has also been highlighted by 
tax practitioners, including the ABA Section of Taxation, which recently 
stated that penalties must be both “consistent” and “logical” to be effective 
in achieving voluntary compliance.
252
 
Part IV.B described how the current tax shelter penalty regime has 
trended away from the IRS and Congress‟s stated policy of enacting 
penalties that are simple and easy to understand, and argued that the 
economic substance penalty further frustrates this policy.  Similarly, the 
varying standards in tax shelter penalties that have evolved over the past 
three decades are increasingly at odds with the policy of promoting fairness 
through consistency.  The ABA Section of Taxation correctly noted that 
“[t]he flurry of recent legislation enacting penalties relating to potentially 
 
 248. Tax Analysts II, supra note 194, at 51. 
 249. IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 7 (describing the IRS‟s approach to 
tax penalties).  See also IRS Policy Statement 20-1, supra note 193, at 7 (describing the 
IRS‟s approach to tax penalties). 
 250. Tax Analysts II, supra note 194, at 51-52. 
 251. See, e.g., REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98. 
 252. Tax Analysts III, supra note 200, at 2 (reporting on ABA Section of Taxation 
setting forth recommendations for federal civil tax penalty reform).  See also Report on 
Civil Tax Penalties, supra note 98, at 6 (describing the way in which “penalties should treat 
similarly situated taxpayers similarly”). 
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abusive transactions had made this area of the penalty regime among the 
most inconsistent . . . .”
253
 
The strict liability aspect of the new economic substance penalty is a 
significant setback in promoting consistency in tax penalties.  The 
inevitable result of applying strict liability to violations of the economic 
substance doctrine but not to other tax shelter penalties is that some tax 
shelter participants will be able to avail themselves of a reasonable cause 
defense while others who are subject to the new economic substance 
penalty will not.  This is a prime example of similarly situated taxpayers 
being treated differently. 
Part IV.B also argued that Congress should not have enacted a new tax 
shelter penalty without thoroughly considering the effectiveness of the 
current accuracy-related penalty regime in addressing violations of the 
economic substance doctrine.  The same principle holds true for the new 
strict liability standard, and we are left with the impression that Congress 
did not fully think things through.  As the IRS task force observed, fairness 
and consistency require that taxpayers who engage in more culpable 
conduct be penalized more harshly than taxpayers who engage in conduct 
that is less egregious.
254
  If Congress wants to introduce a new, stricter 
penalty standard into the accuracy-related regime, that standard should be 
clearly tied to the conduct of “those who deviate farthest”
255
 from 
established standards of behavior. 
It is possible that the downsides of strict liability are outweighed by 
the benefits that would be gained in promoting voluntary compliance and 
deterring taxpayers from participating in abusive tax shelters.  However, if 
Congress‟s aim is to apply strict liability to tax shelters, then all of the 
accuracy-related penalties aimed at tax shelters should provide for this 
standard.  If Congress did not intend to impose strict liability across the 
board, then it should clearly separate and identify only the most egregious 
conduct for strict liability, leaving a reasonable cause defense in place for 
less egregious transactions.  Regardless of the approach, if the accuracy-
related penalty regime is to be perceived as fair and consistently applied, it 
should be readily apparent to taxpayers why stricter penalties apply to some 
transactions and more lenient penalties apply to others.  The new strict 
liability penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine misses 
the mark here, as it arbitrarily singles out some tax shelters for strict 
liability without a limitation for only the worst kinds of tax shelters. 
 
 253. Tax Analysts III, supra note 200, at 6 (reporting on ABA Section on Taxation 
emphasizing that penalties must be consistent). 
 254. See IRS PENALTY HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 52 (describing the IRS‟s approach 
to tax penalties).  See also IRS Policy Statement 20-1, supra note 193, at 7 (describing the 
IRS‟s approach to tax penalties). 
 255. IRS Policy Statement 20-1, supra note 193, at 52. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that enacting a separate penalty provision for 
violations of the economic substance doctrine was wholly unnecessary in 
light of the current accuracy-related penalties that are aimed specifically at 
tax shelters.  The new economic substance penalty does not fill a gap left 
open by these other penalties, but rather adds a redundant, fourth tax shelter 
penalty to the mix.  This inevitably adds undue complexity to the penalty 
regime, which in turn frustrates Congress‟s overall goal of promoting 
voluntary compliance through tax penalties. 
This article has further argued that the strict liability aspect of the new 
economic substance penalty cannot be reconciled with the fact that the 
other tax shelter penalties provide for various forms of a reasonable cause 
defense.  The only way to properly justify a new tax shelter penalty with 
strict liability would be to specifically tie that penalty to the most egregious 
forms of taxpayer conduct.  Congress has not done that in the case of the 
economic substance penalty. 
Without a coherent framework that ties stricter tax penalties to more 
egregious conduct, taxpayers are left trying to make sense of the 
inconsistent standards in the current tax shelter penalty regime.  The only 
discernible pattern that has emerged from the evolution of tax shelter 
penalty legislation over the past three decades is that the penalty that is 
“last in time” is the strictest.  Without any coherent explanation from 
Congress, it is hard not to question whether the economic substance 
doctrine was singled out for strict liability because the codification of the 
economic substance doctrine happened to be the latest phase in tax shelter 
reform.  Congress had already tightened the reins on the reasonable cause 
defense significantly with respect to tax shelters (within the meaning of 
I.R.C. § 6662(d)) and reportable transaction understatements.  If they felt 
the need to take it one step further, there was nowhere else to go from there 
but strict liability. 
The inconsistencies in the penalty regime also make it easy to 
understand why critics have suggested that strict liability was included in 
the new legislation not because it was seen as appropriate for violations of 
the economic substance doctrine, but because it made revenue estimates 
higher (making the health care reconciliation bill more palatable).
256
  These 
considerations may be inevitable facets of the political process, but they are 
not valid justifications for inserting a new strict liability penalty into an 
already complex tax shelter penalty regime. 
 
 
 256. See REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 98, at 1, 4; Stretch et al., supra 
note 98, at 1361; Ventry, supra note 71, at 1410; and text accompanying note 112. 
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APPENDIX A:  Taxpayer Defenses to Accuracy-Related 
PENALTIES
257
 
Non-Tax Shelter 
Substantial 
Understatement 
Gross 
Valuation 
Misstatement 
Penalty 
Substantial 
Understatement 
Penalty for 
Tax Shelters 
Reportable 
Transaction 
Understatement 
Penalty 
Economic 
Substance 
Doctrine 
Penalty 
For all taxpayers: 
 
Reasonable cause 
and good faith 
(§ 6664(c)) 
 
Substantial 
authority 
(§ 6662(d)(2)(B)) 
 
Reasonable basis + 
disclosure 
(§ 6662(d)(2)(B) 
For all 
taxpayers: 
 
Reasonable 
cause and good 
faith       
(§ 6664(c)) 
 
 
 
 
 
For corporations: 
 
Heightened 
reasonable cause 
and good faith 
requiring, at a 
minimum,  
substantial 
authority + 
reasonable belief 
that position more 
likely than not 
correct  
(§ 1.6664-4(f)) 
 
For individuals: 
 
Reasonable cause 
and good faith (§ 
6664(c)) 
 
 
Transactions not 
lacking economic 
substance: 
 
Heightened 
reasonable cause and 
good faith requiring, 
at a minimum, 
disclosure+ 
substantial authority 
+ reasonable belief 
that position more 
likely than not 
correct (§ 6664(d)) 
 
Transactions lacking  
economic substance: 
 
None, strict liability 
(§ 6662(d)) 
For all 
taxpayers: 
 
None, strict  
liability 
(§ 6664(c)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 257. The four tax shelter penalties are juxtaposed with the substantial understatement 
penalty for comparison purposes only.  The table does not reflect all accuracy-related 
penalties, including the penalty for negligence or disregard of rules and regulations under 
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (West 2010). 
